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THE NORTHWEST POWER
ACT: POINT &

COUNTERPOINT

THE UNRAVELING OF THE PARITY PROMISE:
HYDROPOWER, SALMON, AND ENDANGERED
SPECIES IN THE COLUMBIA BASIN
By
MICHAEL C. BLUMM*
ANDY SIMRIN**

In the latest in a series of articles on the Columbia Basin Fish
and Wildlife Program, Professor Blumm and Mr. Simrin analyze
the evolution of the program from the passage of the Northwest
Power Act in 1980 through program amendments adopted as recently as 1990. This review leads them to criticize the interstate
agency responsible for the program, the Northwest Power Planning Council, for failing to defer to the biological judgment of the
region's fish and wildlife agencies on the issue of fish flows in the
Columbia and Snake Rivers. The failure to secure adequate fish
flows has imperiled the entirety of a program once heralded as the
most ambitious biological restoration program in the world and
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Oregon State University Sea Grant Program between 1979-90. My thanks especially to Bill Wick and Tom Gentle for their help over the years. Thanks also to
Lorraine Bodi, Brian Brown, Rob Lothrop, Dan Rohlf, and John Volkman for
their comments on a draft of this article and to Bob Miller for editorial assistance.
** J.D. 1991, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College. B.A.,
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has led to EndangeredSpecies Act considerationfor a number of
Columbia Basin salmon runs. The authors make a number of sug-.
gestions about how to improve the program, including amendments to the Northwest Power Act that would help achieve the
congressional directive of making fish and wildlife'a "co-equal
partner"with hydropower in the operation of the basin's dams. A
postscript responds to Professor Lee's critique contained in the
article following this one.
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INTRODUCTION

The salmon and steelhead trout' runs of the Pacific Northwest are not only of immense economic value to sport, commercial, and tribal harvesters. They are also a barometer of the
health of the aquatic ecosystem to support a host of other uses,
both consumptive and nonconsumptive. Salmon and steelhead
test the health of aquatic ecosystems in the same way the miner's
canary tests air quality. As a result, anadromous fish2 may be considered the Northwest's most important natural resource, just as
they were 135 years ago when the Stevens Indian treaties guaranteed the tribes a share of the harvest.'
Over a dozen years ago, in response to precipitously declining
anadromous fish runs in the upper Columbia River Basin, the Na1. Salmon and trout are members of the family Salmonidae, subfamily
Salmoninae. B. McKEowN, FISH MIGRATION 55 (1984).
2. Anadromous fish spend the majority of their adult life in the ocean, then

migrate upstream to spawn. Id. For a general description of the life cycle of migratory fish and its variations, see Goodman, Preserving the Genetic Diversity of
Salmonid Stocks: A Call for Federal Regulation of Hatchery Programs,20 ENVTL.
L. 111, 115-18 (1990); B. McKEOWN, supra note 1, at 1-57.

3. See Landau, Empty Victories: Indian Treaty Fishing Rights in the Pacific
Northwest, 10 ENvTL. L. 413 (1980). See also F. COHEN, TREATIES ON TRIAL: THE
CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS (1986).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985156

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 21:657

tional Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service initiated a status review to determine whether
upriver runs merited listing under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA).' In 1980, partly in response to the ESA proceeding, Congress included in the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act (Northwest Power Act) detailed provisions
to protect and restore Columbia Basin fish and wildlife. The
Northwest Power Act promised that fish and wildlife would be
treated "on a par" with other river uses, as a "co-equal partner"
with hydropower. Consequently, the two federal fishery agencies
suspended their status review
in 1981 to allow the Act's protec7
tive measures to take effect.
Ten years later, the fruits of the Northwest Power Act failed
to prevent a number of ESA listing petitions, 8 and NMFS reinstated ESA status reviews of five Columbia Basin stocks in 1990.9
Revival of the status reviews prompted an elaborate series of discussions, popularly known as the "Salmon Summit," among numerous users of the Columbia River regarding measures that
could be taken to avert ESA listings.10 Despite these efforts, the
4. 43 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (1978). See Bodi, Protecting Columbia River Salmon
Under the Endangered Species Act, 10 ENVTL. L. 349 (1980).
5. Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h
(1988)).
6. H.R. REP. No. 976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 56, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5989, 6015. See generally, Blumm & Johnson, Promising a
Process for Parity: The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act and Anadromous Fish Protection,11 ENViL. L. 497 (1981) [hereinafter
Parity I].
7. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FiSH
& WILDLIFE PROGRAM UNDER THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST ELECTRIC POWER PLANNING

AND CONSERVATioN ACT 15-16 (1981) (hereinafter COALImON RECOMMENDATIONS].
See Political Foot-Dragging:Delays by Reagan Administration Make Recovery of
Owl, Salmon More Difficult, Idaho Falls Post Reg., Dec. 26, 1990, at Al, col. 2
[hereinafter Political Foot-Dragging].
8. On April 2, 1990, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe petitioned NMFS to list
Snake River sockeye. 55 Fed. Reg. 22,942 (1990). Although the tribe did not know
it, NMFS had already initiated a status review. The notice was published on April
9, 1990. Id. at 22,943. The notice was dated April 2, 1990. 55 Fed. Reg. 13,181. On
June 7, Oregon Trout, along with numerous other organizations, petitioned NMFS
to list Snake River spring, summer, and fall chinook and lower Columbia River
coho. 55 Fed. Reg. 37,342. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
9. 55 Fed. Reg. 13,181 (Snake River sockeye); 55 Fed. Reg. 37,342 (Snake
River spring, summer, and fall chinook and Columbia River coho).
10. See infra notes 387-97 and accompanying text. See also Koberstein, Bat-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985156

UNRAVELING OF THE PROMISE

1991l

NMFS proposed listing three species under the ESA in mid1991.11
If the Northwest Power Act aimed to prevent the ESA listings, as the federal fishery agencies apparently believed," it obviously failed, despite the Act's call for "equal footing" between hydropower and fish in the Columbia Basin.1 3 In this Article, we
examine the roots of that failure by evaluating the evolution of
the Act's Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, a restoration program heralded as "possibly, the most ambitious effort in
the world to save a biological resource. ' 14 Unfortunately, our
study indicates that the interstate compact agency which promulgated the program, the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning anti Conservation Council (the Council), has frequently declined to defer to the biological expertise of the region's federal
and state fishery agencies and Indian tribes, especially on the
critical issue of the stream flows necessary to transport juvenile
fish to the ocean. We believe that in doing so, the Council has
contravened congressional intent and materially damaged the
fishery resource it was created to protect.
While the Council's program is in many respects a pathbreaking restoration effort, its failure to supply biologically necessary fish flows has led to the ESA proceedings which now seem
destined to overshadow the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program's promise of parity. In our judgment, congressional action is necessary to rescue the failed parity promise, and we offer
tie Lines Form Over Wild Salmon's Future, The Sunday Oregonian, May 27,
1990, at Al, col. 1; BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, THE COLUMBIA BASIN AcCORD (1990).

11. On April 2, 1991, NMFS proposed listing Snake River sockeye as an endangered species. 56 Fed. Reg. 14,055 (1991). On June 7, 1991, NMFS proposed
both Snake River fall chinook and Snake River spring/summer chinook as
threatened species, but rejected the lower Columbia coho petition because the
agency concluded that the available biological information indicated that lower
Columbia coho do not constitute a species under the ESA. 56 Fed. Reg. 29,542
(1991). On ESA protections, see infra § V.
12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom, Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 471 U.S.
1116 (1985).
14. NORTHWEST POWER
AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM

PLANNING COUNCIL, 1987 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN

5 (1987) [hereinafter 1987

FISH

PROGRAM].
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some suggestions as to how Congress should amend the Northwest Power Act.
Section II of this Article begins by discussing the 1980 Act
and its call for an unprecedented fish and wildlife restoration program. Section III traces the evolution of the Columbia Basin Fish
and Wildlife Program in detail, from the 1981 program recommendations to amendments approved as recently as 1990. Section
IV focuses attention on the program's Achilles' Heel: its provisions for mainstem (nontributary) fish flows. Section V turns to
the prospect of ESA listings: first by examining the state of certain depleted wild runs, then by explaining the institutional effects of ESA listing, and finally by examining the failure of the
"Salmon Summit" to respond effectively to the flow issue. Section
VI concludes with our prescriptions as to how the parity promise
can be fulfilled, including some suggested amendments to the
Northwest Power Act. A postscript responds to Professor Lee's
criticisms which appear in the article following this one.
II. ESTABLISHING THE PARITY PROMISE: THE ENACTMENT OF
THE NORTHWEST POWER

ACT

River flows are the linchpin of the Pacific Northwest's economy. No other region in the country is so dependent on water
power for electricity.ls Over forty percent of the nation's hydropower is generated in the Northwest by more than one hundred
and fifty dams owned by the federal government and public and
private utilities.1 6 These projects are integrated to form the
world's largest hydroelectric system, furnishing more than seventy percent of the Northwest's electricity. 7
15. For a history of the development of Northwest hydroelectric projects and
policies, see Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L.
REV. 175 (1983) [hereinafter Hydroelectric Heritage].
16. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGION AT THE CROSSROADS--THE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST SEARCHES FOR NEW SOURCES OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY

(1978).

See also Wandschneider, Managing River Systems: CentralizationVersus Decentralization, 24 NAT. RES. J. 1043 (case study of Columbia River management).

17. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AND
ELECTRIC POWER PLAN 1-1, 5-1 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 POWER PLAN]. The combined system has a peak capacity of 29,800 megawatts and an average firm energy
capability of 16,400 megawatts. Id. at 5-1.
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This abundant, low cost energy source enabled the region in
the New Deal era to establish public utilities to serve as a yardstick to measure the reasonableness of private utility rates. Public
power also made possible the electrification of rural areas that
private utilities found uneconomical to serve. In addition, cheap
federal hydropower allowed the Northwest to attract an electricintensive aluminum industry that helped diversify an economy
heavily dependent on nonmanufacturing industries subject to frequent "boom and bust cycles"." s
The rivers of the Northwest are important for more than just
the kilowatts they generate, however. They provide essential
habitat for some of the world's most economically valuable fisheries. The chinook salmon runs of the Columbia Basin were once
the largest in the world, forming the mainstay of Native American subsistence and culture." The development of the Columbia
hydroelectric system has devastated these fish runs. Anadromous
fish runs in the Columbia Basin dwindled from an estimated ten
to sixteen million fish before white settlement to about two-and20
a-half million today-a diminution of roughly eighty percent.
Certainly activities other than hydroelectric development and operations contributed to these losses,21 but there is no question
that dams are the chief culprits, particularly those on the main18. Nonmanufacturing industries include farming, fishing, and forestry. Public power was a centerpiece of the New Deal's economic strategy. See G. NORWOOD, COLUMBIA RIVER POWER FOR THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF POLICIES OF THE
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION 32-33, 69-78, 95-102, 137-48 (1981); Hydroe-

lectric Heritage, supra note 15, at 191-202. The aluminum industry's roots in the
Northwest may be traced to preparations for World War II, although its presence

doubled in the early 1960s. G. NORWOOD, supra, at 133-35; Hydroelectric Heritage, supra note 15, at 214-15.
19. See Wilkinson & Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of a Transboundary Common Property Resource, 32
KAN. L. REV. 17, 23, 26-29 (1983).
20. See 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 203, at 35.
21. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, overfishing was a major cause of
the decline. Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 19, at 30-35. Other factors include
habitat degrading land use practices such as timber harvesting, grazing, mining,

chemical pollution from both point and nonpoint sources, and water withdrawals,
mostly for irrigation.

NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COMPILATION OF IN-

FORMATION ON SALMON

AND

STEELHEAD LOSSES IN THE COLUMBIA

RIVER BASIN

(1986) [hereinafter LOSSES STUDY]. Recently, a good deal of attention has focused
on the adverse effect on wild stocks of fish resulting from overreliance on fish
hatcheries. See Goodman, supra note 2.
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stem Columbia and its principal tributary, the Snake."*
Dams inundate spawning grounds, change water temperatures, increase pollutants, disrupt downstream gravel recruitment,
and reduce oxygen availability.2 They also alter Streamflow regimes, depriving juvenile anadromous fish of the spring and summer flows necessary to transport them to the ocean."4 Moreover,
although most Columbia Basin mainstem dams are equipped with
fish ladders to enable upstream migration, many dams have no
comparable measures to facilitate downstream migration of juvenile fish headed for the ocean.' 5 Consequently, an estimated fifteen to thirty percent of juvenile fish perish at each dam. s" For
upriver runs, which must pass up to nine dams without adequate
bypass systems 7or minimum flows, cumulative losses can exceed
ninety percent.'
Congress expressed concern about the fate of the Columbia's
anadromous fish runs as long ago as 1937, when it passed the
Bonneville Project Act."s Nevertheless, the damming of the basin's river flows continued."9 Hydroelectric operations began to
22. See LossEs STUDY, supra note 21; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST POWER BILL 20, app. IV at 1
(1979) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. See generally Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon:
The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's Anadromous Fish Resources for a Peaceful Coexistence with the FederalColumbia River Power System, 11 ENVTL.L. 211
(1981) [hereinafter Hydropower vs. Salmon).
23. LossEs STUDY, supra note 21, at 140, 146 (discussing inundation of
spawning grounds and temperature effects); J. ECHEVERRIA, P. BARROW & R. RoosCOLLINS, RIVERS AT RISK: THE CONCERNED CITIZENS GUIDE To HYDROPOWER 4-5
(1989); Thatcher, The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act: Fish and Wildlife Protection Outside the Columbia River Basin, 13
ENVTL. L. 517, 520 n.11 (1983); Victory Sand and Concrete, Inc. v. Commissioner,
61 T.C. 407, 412 (1974) (finding that dams on Kansas River tributaries trap ninety
percent of the sand and gravel flowing downstream).
24. See 1 COALITION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 163-210.
25. Id. at 227-29.
26. 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 203(b)(1), at 36. In addition, 5-10% of
upstream migrating adults are killed at each dam. Id.
27. Id. at 38.
28. Pub. L. No. 75-329, 50 Stat. 731 (1937) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 832-8321). The Senate passed a resolution directing the Commissioner of Fisheries to assess the effect of the Bonneville Dam on the Columbia fish runs and to
recommend steps "to attain the full conservation of such fish ...." See S. Doc.
No. 87, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
29. See generally Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 22, at 223-49. See also
Goble, Introduction to the Symposium on Legal Structures for Managing the Pa-
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dominate river flow in the 1960s. In 1964, the system was contractually integrated, and a treaty with Canada authorized large storage projects that would eventually double the basin's storage capacity. 0 When the Canadian projects were completed in the
1970s, system operators acquired the ability to store much of the
upper Columbia's spring freshet (upon which migrating fish depend for transportation to the ocean) for release later in the year
when increased demand for electricity brings higher prices. On
the Snake, lower natural flows, coupled with numerous dams with1
inadequate bypass systems, produced the most severe effects.3
The Snake runs declined so severely that the federal fishery agencies considered invoking ESA protection in 1978.38
The ESA proceeding, along with a General Accounting Office
report concluding that dams were the principal cause of the decline in the fish runs, 8 focused congressional attention at a time
when Congress was preparing to revise Northwest electric policific Northwest Salmon and Steelhead: The Biological and HistoricalContext, 22
IDAHO L. REV. 417 (1986).
30. Integration of the system was formalized by the Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement in 1964. The Coordination Agreement established detailed
operating criteria and power exchange principles, and required the system to operate as if owned by a single utility on the basis of an annual integrated system
plan. See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, ELECTRIC POWER AND THE FUTURE OF
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST

54-55 (1980); J. Jolliffe, C. Mohler & L. Dean, The Pacific

Northwest Coordination Agreement (paper presented at the Inst. of Electric and
Electronic Engrs., Jan. 31-Feb. 5, 1965). The Coordination Agreement was an outgrowth of the Columbia River Treaty, Jan. 17, 1961-Sept. 16, 1964, United StatesCanada, 15 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5538. The treaty authorized four large storage projects and gave Canada half of the downstream hydropower and flood control benefits. See Hydroelectric Heritage, supra note 15, at 215-19; N. SWAINSON.
CONFLICT OVER

TREATY

THE COLUMBIA:

THE

CANADIAN

BACKGROUND

TO AN

HISTORIC

(1979).

31. See E.

CHANEY,

A

QUESTION OF BALANCE: WATER/ENERGY-SALMON

STEELHEAD PRODUCTION IN THE UPPER COLUMBIA
L. PERRY, COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON

RIVER

BASIN

(1978); E.

AND

CHANEY &

AND STEELHEAD ANALYSIS: SUMMARY

REPORT

(1976) (noting drastic declines in anadromous fish runs during the 1970s).
32. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Much of the remainder of this
Section is adapted from Blumm, Reexamining the Parity Promise: More Challenges Than Successes To the Implementation of the Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 461, 466-85 (1986) [hereinafter Parity IV]; and
Blumm, The Northwest Power Act's Institutional Innovations and Unfulfilled
Promises, 2 J. ENVTL. L. & LIT. 165 (1987) [hereinafter Unfulfilled Promises].

33. GAO

REPORT,

supra note 22.
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cies.& Under the leadership of Congressmen John Dingell and
Morris Udall, s8 what began as a bill to enlarge the mandate of the
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), 86 the region's federal
electric power marketing agency, became a law with unprecedented fish and wildlife restoration objectives.
The Northwest Power Act, 7 signed into law in late 1980, directed the Northwest Power Planning Council" to create a pro34. The impetus for rewriting the region's electric laws was a combination of
(1) projected drastic power shortages and (2) the demise of a plan to meet those
shortages with construction of new thermal plants and power turbines at existing
dams. This "Hydro-Thermal Power Plan," a joint venture between the region's
federal electric wholesaler, BPA, and local utilities, was enjoined for failure to
comply with National Environmental Policy Act requirements. Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Hodel, 435 F. Supp. 590 (D. Or. 1977), affd, 626 F.2d 134 (9th
Cir. 1980). See K. LEE, D. KLEMA & M. MARTS, supra note 30, at 60-96 (detailed
background on Hydro-Thermal Program); Hydroelectric Heritage, supra note 15,
at 221-30.
35. For Congressman Dingell's recollections, see Dingell, Congress Reviews
the Act, NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS, Dec./Jan. 1986, at 12 (published by Northwest
Power Council). See also 123 CONG. REc. H10,680-86 (Nov. 17, 1980) (remarks of
Rep. Dingell).
36. The motivation for enlarging BPA's mandate sprang from an erroneous
perception that the system faced impending power shortages. See Cavanagh, The
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation (And Thermal
Power Plant Relief) Act, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 27, 30-31 (1980) (describing,
distrustfully, BPA's expectation of impending power shortages); Weighing the
New Surplus, NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS Aug. 1982, at 1 (published by Northwest
Power Planning Council) (describing BPA's revised forecast of power surpluses).
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1988).
38. The Act authorized the creation of the Northwest Power Planning Council, an interstate compact agency, upon appointment of Council members by three
of the four Pacific Northwest states. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a). Although authorized by
federal law, the Council is not a federal agency. Id. § 839b(a)(2)(A)(iv). However,
the Council does constrain the operations of federal agencies, although the extent
of that constraint remains unclear. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
See generally Hemingway, The Northwest Power Planning Council: Its Origins
and Future Role, 13 ENVTL. L. 673 (1983).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Congress' ability to create an interstate compact
by advance consent and subsequent state acceptance, rather than by ratifying an
existing interstate agreement, in Seattle Master Builders' Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power and Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 (1987). The court also upheld the constitutionality of the Council against an appointments clause challenge. Id. at 1364-66. See
Blumm, The Appointments Clause, Innovative Federalismand the Constitutionality of the Northwest Power Planning Council, 8 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y. 1 (1987);
for a series of articles concerning Seattle Master Builders and the Council's au-
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gram to "protect, mitigate, and enhance" the Columbia Basin's
fish and wildlife "to the extent affected by the development and
operation" of the basin's hydroelectric system.8 ' The Act specifically aimed to improve fish flows in the river and to provide bypass systems at mainstem dams. 40 The legislative history envisioned that the Council's plan would make fish and wildlife "coequal partner[s]" with hydroelectric production in the operation
4
of the dams, "on a par" with other project purposes. '
To achieve these ambitious objectives, the Northwest Power
Act authorized a number of innovations that place it in the vanguard of federal fish and wildlife law. First, the statute called for
a systemwide remedial program for the entire Columbia Basin, 4"
instead of limiting itself to project-by-project goals." Second, the
Act revolutionized the philosophy of wildlife mitigation by emphasizing changes in project operations," rather than merely creating substitute resources. The Act authorized "offsite enhancement," that is, compensation for irretrievable losses in particular
areas with restoration measures in areas where suitable habitat
remains." Third, Congress lowered the burden of proof for undertaking action by requiring that the remedial program (1) be based
only on "best available scientific knowledge,""14 not scientific certhority, see 17 ENvTL. L. 767-999 (1987).

39. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A), (h)(10)(A).
40. Id. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(i)-(ii).
41. H.R. REP. No. 976, supra note 6, at 49, 56-57.
42. The Columbia Basin, including the drainage of its principal tributary, the
Snake, encompasses 258,000 square miles, including most of Idaho, Oregon, Washington, western Montana, and portions of Wyoming and British Columbia. THE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OP FACTS 535 (M. Hoffman ed. 1990). The portion of
the basin in Canada is, of course, beyond the jurisdiction of the Northwest Power
Act.
43. The Act mandates that "(tihe program, to the greatest extent possible,
shall be designed to deal with . .. [the Columbia] river and its tributaries as a
system." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A) (1988).
44. Id. § 839b(h)(1)(A), (h)(2)(B), (h)(5), (h)(6)(E)(i).
45. "Enhancement measures may be used, in appropriate circumstances, as a
means of achieving offaite protection and mitigation with respect to compensation
for losses arising from the development and operation of the hydroelectric facilities of the Columbia River and its tributaries as a system." Id. § 839b(h)(8)(A).
.46. Id. § 839b(h)(6)(B). Under the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 661-666c (1988), water project operators and regulators effectively
placed the burden of proof on fish and wildlife advocates to document losses due
to project development and operators as well as the specific benefits that proposed
mitigation measures would produce. The shortcomings of the Coordination Act
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tainty;47 (2) favor biological outcomes over economic ones,4s and
(3) defer to the recommendations of agencies and Indian tribes
with fish and wildlife expertise. 4' Fourth, the statute tapped the
revenue stream generated by hydroelectric sales as the principal
source of financing for the restoration effort it called for," thus
avoiding some of the uncertainties and inequities of relying on
future congressional appropriations.'
Finally, the Northwest Power Act substantially revised a
number of institutional relationships. Most notable, of course,
was the creation of the interstate Northwest Power Planning
Council as a voice of regionalism."3 Less obvious, but perhaps of
are detailed in Blumm, Fulfilling the Parity Promise: A Perspective on Scientific
Proof, Economic Cost and Indian Treaty Rights in the Approval of the Columbia
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 13 ENwrL. L. 103, 108-12 (1982) [hereinafter

Parity II].
47. Thus, the Act espoused a kind of biological form of policy analysis,
termed "adaptive management" by Professor Kai Lee. See Lee & Lawrence,
Adaptive Management: Learningfrom the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVn. L. 431 (1986).
48. The Act authorized "minimum economic cost" alternatives only when
they achieve "the same sound biological objective[s]"). 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(C)
(1988). See Parity II, supra note 46, at 131-39.
49. The program must be based on fish and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations, "complement existing and future activities" of the fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes, and give "due weight" to their "recommendations, expertise,
and legal rights and responsibilities." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(5), (h)(6)(A), (h)(7). On
the deference the Council owes to the recommendations of the fish and wildlife
agencies and Indian tribes, see Parity II, supra note 46, at 124-31.
50. BPA is authorized to use its financial and legal authorities "in a manner
consistent" with the program. Id. § 839b(h)(10)(A). Electric ratepayers are obliged
to pay fish and wildlife costs attributable to hydroelectric development and operations. Id. § 839b(h)(8)(B). The advantages of using federal hydropower revenues
to finance regional water-related initiatives are explored in Volkman & Lee,
Within the Hundredth Meridian: Western States in a Time of Transition, 59 U.
COLO. L. REV. 551 (1988).
51. Regional ratepayer funding is faster, fairer, and more accessible to the
affected public than national taxpayer funding. See Blumm, Implementing the
Parity Promise: An Evaluation of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 14 ENVTL. L. 277, 348-51 (1984) [hereinafter ParityIII]. However, some fish
and wildlife measures-notably installation of mechanical bypass systems at federal dams-continue to be funded through congressional appropriations. See infra
notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
52. See generally Volkman & Lee, supra note 50, at 562-69. See also
Volkman, Testing New Forms of River Basin Governance: Implications of the
Seattle Master Builders Case, 17 ENVTL. L. 835 (1987).
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greater long-term significance, was the Act's recognition of Indian
tribes as the equal of state fish and wildlife agencies.53 Historically, state fish and wildlife agencies and Northwest Indian tribes
fought epic battles over the allocation of anadromous fish," to the
detriment of the resource itself. The 1980 statute began the transformation of these foes into allies who subsequently forged a regionwide coalition that has proven to be an effective voice for
fishery restoration measures.55
A less successful institutional innovation was the Northwest
Power Act's attempt to give the nonfederal Northwest Power
Planning Council some control over the federal water project operators and regulators charged with implementing the Council's
program." A number of important program provisions have been
essentially ignored5 7 because of ambiguously drafted enforcement
53. The statute delineated the role of the tribes in formulating the Columbia
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program in 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(2), (h)(4)(A), (h)(5)-(7),
(h)(11)(B) (1988).
"54. See Landau, supra note 3; F. COHEN, supra note 3.
55. The coalition was instrumental in negotiating the 1985 Pacific Salmon
Treaty. Pacific Salmon Treaty, Jan. 28, 1985, United States-Canada, 99 Stat. 7 (S.
TiwxTv Doc. No. 99-2, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985); not published in T.I.A.S.)
[hereinafter Pacific Salmon Treaty]. The treaty aimed, among other things, to reduce Canadian interception of Columbia River anadromous fish. See Jensen, The
United States/Canada Pacific Salmon Interception Treaty: An Historical and
Legal Overview, 16 ENvWL. L. 363 (1986).
A second manifestation of the coalition is the Fish Passage Center established
under the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program. 1987 PROGRAM, supra note
14, § 303(b), at 57. The Fish Passage managers consist of one member representing the fishery agencies and one representing the tribes. Id. § 302, at 54. The managers have almost always taken a uniform position on passage issues.
Third, the agencies and tribes have formed the Columbia River Fish and
Wildlife Authority, an informal entity that helped organize its members to successfully lobby Congress to fund installation of mechanical bypass systems on
mainstem federal dams. See infra note 227 and accompanying text. The Fish and
Wildlife Authority also pressured BPA to negotiate a spill program to assist fish
passage pending bypass installation. See infra notes 250-54 and accompanying
text.
56. The four federal water managers who influence Columbia River flows are
the BPA (as marketer of federal hydropower), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(as operator of most of the mainstem federal dams), the Bureau of Reclamation
(as operator of several large storage dams, including the Grand Coulee Dam), and
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (as regulator of nonfederal dams, such
as the five mainstem public utility district dams on the mid-Columbia and Idaho
Power Company's dams on the Snake).
57. See, e.g., infra notes 101-04 (Snake River flows), 153 (spill provisions),
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provisions," and because of the Council's unwillingness to involve
itself in implementation issues. In addition, the deference that
Congress expected the Council to give to the fish and wildlife
agencies and the tribes on biological issues" failed to materialize,
especially with respect to mainstem flows. Despite the statute's
deferential instructions and an admonition in the legislative history that it not become a "super" fish and wildlife agency,e" the
Council ignored the biological judgment of the agencies and the
tribes on some of the most controversial and longstanding issues
it faced." The principal shortcomings of the Columbia Basin Fish
and Wildlife Program are a consequence of the Council's biological hubris and its lack of interest in enforcement.
III.

IMPLEMENTING THE PARITY PROMISE: THE EvOLUTION OF
THE COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM

The process of developing the Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program reflected the congressional expectation that the
newly created Council would have no fish and wildlife expertise.
Rather than have the Council attempt to fashion the program out
of whole cloth, Congress directed the Council to request recommendations from the region's fish and wildlife agencies and Indian
tribes as well as from power interests and the general pub6
lic.

2

In April of 1981, seven months after the statute was signed

into law, a coalition of federal and state fish and wildlife agencies
and Indian tribes (the "fishery coalition") submitted an extensive
set of recommendations for the program and supporting
rationales."
and 309-10 (weak Council resolve) and accompanying text.
58. The Northwest Power Act requires BPA to use its financial and legal authorities "in a manner consistent with" the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (1988). It requires all four federal water
management agencies to give "equitable treatment" to fish and wildlife. Id. §
839b(h)(1l)(A)(i). It also directs the federal agencies to take the Columbia Basin
Fish and Wildlife Program "into account to the fullest extent practicable" at each
relevant stage of their decision making. Id. § 839b(h)(A)(ii).
59. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
60. 126 CONG. REc. H29,810 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Dingell).
61. See infra notes 93-99 (mainstem flow recommendations rejected), 147-56,
198-201 (spill recommendations rejected), and accompanying text.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(g)(2)-(3), (h)(2) (1988).
63. See COALITON RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7. The recommendations
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A.

The 1981 Fishery Coalition Recommendations

The fishery coalition devoted over two hundred pages to the
issue of improving the survival of downstream migrating juvenile
fish, and made several recommendations: minimum flows, installation of juvenile bypass systems, and interim spills at mainstem
dams (until bypass systems are installed)." On the critical mainstem flow issue, the fishery coalition identified the Snake River
runs as those most severely affected by low flows. Dam construction and hydropower operations had increased travel time from
spawning grounds in the Snake Basin to the sea from twenty-two
to forty-one days, significantly increasing mortality from predation and residualism (loss of urge to migrate). 6" The coalition
graphically illustrated the strong correlation between river flows
and fish survival, and noted that optimum survival would require
average weekly spring flows of 300-350 thousand cubic feet per
second (kcfs) at The Dalles Dam on the lower Columbia." However, in order to reduce impacts on hydroelectric generation, most
of the coalition's members recommended minimum flows of only
220 kcfs at The Dalles, but warned that new biological information might necessitate higher flows.6 7 The Columbia River InterTribal Fish Commission" refused to endorse this concession to
hydropower generation, asserting that Indian treaties entitled the
tribes to optimum flows of 300 kcfs or greater. 6
The fishery coalition refined its flow recommendations into
detailed, month-by-month minimum flows at The Dalles, Priest
Rapids (on the mid-Columbia), and Lower Granite Dams (on the
are discussed in detail in Fish and Wildlife Program Recommendations Submitted To Regional Council, ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO, Dec. 1981 (issue no. 16,
Nat. Resources L. Inst.)[hereinafter Fish & Wildlife Recommendations). Members of the "fishery coalition" included the state fishery agencies from Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, the NMFS, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (a coalition representing four
Columbia River treaty tribes: the Confederated Tribes and Bands of (1) the Warm
Springs, (2) the Umatilla, and (3) the Yakima Indian Nation, and (4) the Nez
Perce tribe).
64. See 1 COALrTIoN RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 156-377.
65. Id. at 156-68.
66. Id. at 167-69.
67. Id. at 169. Below 220 kcfs, mortalities of more than 90% would be incurred. Id.
68. See supra note 63.
69. 1 COALITION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 170.
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lower Snake), with peak flows in May.' ° In addition, the coalition
proposed a "share the wealth/share the shortage", .or "sliding
scale," plan, that could reduce the specified flows by twenty-five
percent in low flow years and increase flows by fifteen percent at
Priest Rapids and sixty percent at Lower Granite in high flow
71
years.
The fishery coalition also recommended a goal of restoring
the Columbia Basin's anadromous fish runs to their levels preceding construction of the McNary Dam in 1953.11 Depending on the
species, this goal would have increased average run sizes between
thirty percent and four hundred percent.7 The coalition also recommended measures designed to (1) establish minimum flows be70. The recommended peak flows were 220 kcfs at The Dalles, 130 kcfs at
Priest Rapids, and 85 kcfs at Lower Granite. Id. at 180. These recommendations
drew substantially on the recommendations that an earlier fishery coalition, the
Columbia River Fisheries Committee (CRFC), made in 1979. The CRFC, which
comprised the same entities mentioned supra note 63, recommended peak "minimum" flows of 85 kcfs at Lower Granite, 130 kcfs at Priest Rapids, and 220 kcfs at

Bonneville. It also recommended peak "optimum" flows of 140 kcfs at Lower
Granite, 140 kcfs at Priest Rapids, and 300 kcfs at Bonneville. See J. LAWRENCE,

K.

LEE

& N.

PALMER, THE WATER BUDGET.

A

STEP TOWARDS BALANCING FISH AND

POWER IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 76 (U. of Wash. Water Resources Technical
Rep. No. 81 1983)[BALANCING FISH AND POWER].
71. 1 COALITION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 181-83. This recommendation represented a considerable change from the 1979 CRFC recommendation
and produced a drastic reduction in expected firm power losses, from 3600 to 490
megawatts. BALANCING FISH AND POWER, supra note 70, at 79, 85. The coalition
also recommended that it be given the option of making no reduction in flows
during a low flow year but forfeiting any right to flows at all the following year. 1
COALITION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 168. This sort of wager is commonplace among hydropower operators. See Operation of the Federal Columbia River
Power System and the Structuring of Administrative Decisionmaking, ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO, Oct. 1980, at 6 (issue no. 10, Nat. Resources L. Inst.).
72. 1 COALITION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 116. Arguably, the goal
should have been to restore fish levels to those existing prior to any hydroelectric
development. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A), (h)(10)(A) (1988) and supra text accompanying note 39 (setting a goal of restoration "to the extent affected by the
development and operation" of the hydroelectric system). However, the fishery
coalition compromised in order to minimize economic costs. I COALITION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 116.
73. If the recommended goals were achieved, average run sizes would rise as
follows: (1) spring chinook, from 101,000 to 300,000; (2) summer chinook, from
41,000 to 200,000; (3) fall chinook, from 294,000 to 400,000; (4) coho, from 45,600
to 164,000; and (5) steelhead, from 124,000 to 400,000. 1 COALITION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 24, at 130.
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low tributary dams;7 ' (2) install effective bypass systems at mainstem dams;7 s with sufficient spills to facilitate bypass by juvenile
migrants in the interim;7 * (3) conduct research on the causes and
solutions to predation and residualism;"7 (4) improve upstream
adult passage;78 and (5) increase the effectiveness of both natural
and hatchery production.7 '
Just as important as these biological recommendations were a
series of recommendations aimed at changing institutional decision-making procedures, including an analysis by BPA of how it
could incorporate fish and wildlife considerations into power marketing decisions.8s The recommendations also included studies of
how fish flows could be accommodated under procedures implementing the Columbia River Treaty, the Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement, and other hydroelectric system operating
procedures."s To fulfill the congressional goal of making fish and
wildlife a "co-equal partner" in the operation of the system,es the
coalition recommended a number of participatory measures, including mandatory consultation between water project managers
74. Id. at 211-23.
75. Id. at 224-75, 291-93.
76. Id. at 229.
77. Id. at 310-30.
78. Id. at 384-415.
79. 2 CoALmoN RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 416-564, 656-78. Natural
production measures included flows to improve spawning habitat, as well as
habitat improvement projects. Id. at 416-564.
80. In recommending new decision making procedures, the Coalition argued
that
[t]raditionally, fishery needs have been treated as a secondary or 'soft' constraint in the operation of the river, while power production has been considered as a primary or dominant constraint. In consequence, fishery needs
are only taken into account after all major power system decisions have
been made ....
The current situation cannot continue. Either the institutions responsible
for power planning, management, and operation of the river must modify
their treatment of fisheries and incorporate fisheries into their basic assumptions for operation of the river, or the ultimate extinction of upriver
runs must be accepted. Realistically, there is no middle ground.
Id. at 679.
81. Id. at 686-96. For an overview of the Columbia River Treaty, see Hydroelectric Heritage, supra note 15, at 215-19. For a discussion of Coordination Agreement procedures, see Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 22, at 249-54.
82. See H.R. REP. No. 976, supra note 6, at 49, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5989, 6015.
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and fishery agencies and tribes.8" Although the Council received
other recommendations," the fishery coalition presented the only
comprehensive set of recommendations, and they formed the basis of much of the program the Council promulgated in 1982.
B.

The 1982 Columbia Basin Program

After widespread public involvement,"5 the Council promulgated its Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program in November, 1982, less than two years after the Northwest Power Act was
signed into law. The Council rejected the fishery coalition's recommended goal of run sizes equal to those preceding construction
of McNary Dam because it was not based on the statutory directive of "best available scientific knowledge". 6 Instead, the program directed BPA to fund a study to (1) estimate fish losses
from hydroelectric development and operations, (2) determine the
existing production potential of the basin, and (3) develop area by
area, stock by stock goals. This study, expected to be completed
in early 1984, would encounter considerable difficulties as BPA
attempted to control its direction. Persistent delays in completing
the study eventually induced the Council to assume management
87
control.
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 697-718.
84. A total of 10 sets of recommendations were submitted to the Council. See
Fish & Wildlife Recommendations, supra note 63, at 11-15.
85. Extensive public involvement preceded promulgation of the program, including two rounds of public hearings, some 3200 pages of public testimony, and
over 5000 pages of written comment from more than 600 commentators. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1982 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE
PROGRAM § 100 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 PROGRAM].
86. Id. § 201. The pre-McNary goal was actually a rough estimate of hydroelectric system accountability for fish losses, not a blueprint for program priorities.
But the Council feared that adopting such a goal implied that the program would
attempt to restore the Columbia runs to a pre-1953 level, ignoring the realities of
the 1980s. Consequently, the Council distinguished fish losses due to hydroelectric
effects from program goals. The latter would be limited by the production potential of the developed system. See id.
87. BPA failed to fund the study in 1983, alleging that the study plan proposed by the fishery agencies and tribes was "unacceptable to BPA management"
and "not consistent with ratepayers interests" because it would amount to funding
"advocacy" and be inconsistent with "sound business principles." See Parity III,
supra note 51, at 291 n.58. As a result, the study was delayed two years, and the
Council did not set program goals until 1987. See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.

83. 2 COALmON
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The centerpiece of the 1982 program was its response to the
fishery coalition's recommended mainstem flows. Instead of
adopting the recommended "sliding scale" flows," the Council
avoided fixed flow levels and proposed a volumetric approach instead. The Council computed the volume of flows required by the
fishery coalition's recommendations for what the Council thought
was the peak of the spring downstream migration season (April 15
through June 15), then deducted the amount of water normally
flowing during that period to serve power and other purposes. s"
The difference, over 4.6 million acre feet (maf), would be made
available to representatives of the fishery coalition to shape and
time water flows to benefit juvenile fish migration." This proposed "Water Budget" had two advantages over the recommended fixed flows: it would cost less in foregone hydropower
revenues, and it would involve representatives of the fishery community in day-to-day system operations.'1 It seemed to be precisely the kind of "innovative and imaginative"
approach to the
s
flow problem that Congress wanted."
However, excitement over the innovation of the proposed
Water Budget masked at least three of its shortcomings. First, it
failed to provide a sufficient volume of water to supply the coalition's recommended flows on the Snake.' 3 Second, the Council deleted from the coalition's recommendations any control on the
lower Columbia." Finally, it limited the budget period from April
88. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
89. See 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 85, §§ 302-304. The Council concluded

that the coalition's minimum flow recommendations would produce a volume of
water equivalent to 67.8 kcfs-months, or 4.03 million acre-feet (maO comprised of
40.2 kcfs-months (2.39 maf) at Priest Rapids Dam and 27.6 kcfs-months (1.64

maf) at Lower Granite. One kcfs-months is a flow of 1,000 cubic feet per second
for one month, or 0.0595 maf. The Council concluded, on the basis of computer
simulations (although without discussion of the assumptions and limitations of
the computer program) that the flow recommendation would jeopardize reservoir
refill on the Snake River. Id. It therefore reduced the Lower Granite water budget
to 20 kcfs-months (1.19 ma). To compensate for this reduction, it increased the

Priest Rapids budget to 58 kcfs-months (3.45 maf), for a total budget of 78 kcfmonths (4.64 maf). Id. § 304(a)(1).
90. Id.
91. See BALANCING FISH AND POWER, supra note 70, at 94.
92. H.R. REP. No. 976, supra note 6, at 57.
93. See 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 85, § 303.
94. The Council, without elaboration, simply stated, "No Water Budget
would be established for The Dalles, since flows at Priest Rapids and Lower Gran-
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15 to June 15, a constraint without biological justification because
the peak migration of many runs extends well beyond June 15.'
During consultation on the proposed budget, BPA and the
utilities expressed serious reservations about the concept and
questioned the Council's authority to establish it." The tribes,
whose willingness to relinquish their claim to optimum flows
made the budget concept politically feasible," now requested a
larger budget: one that would increase foregone hydropower by
about twenty-five percent." The Council rejected this increment,
concluding that it would not significantly increase juvenile fish
travel time, but would jeopardize refill." The Council supplied no
rationale for these conclusions, though it promised to reconsider
the matter at a later date-a promise it never kept.
In addition to the volume of water in the proposal, the final
Water Budget included "firm power flows" in both the spring and
summer on which the budget was to be built.' ° ° Subsequent

events indicated that these base flows were not, in fact, provided
by the hydroelectric system.10' Similarly, the Council's recomite determine the flow at The Dalles." Id. While it is hard to dispute the Council's
conclusion, its logic is suspect. A flow requirement in the lower Columbia would
presumably require higher flows at Priest Rapids if flows at Lower Granite could
not be supplied. With no lower river requirement, fish benefiting from the Priest
Rapids flows on the mid-Columbia might nevertheless be stranded without sufficient flows in the lower Columbia.
95. In fact, the middle 80% of many Snake River spring and summer chinook
runs extend past June 15. See National Marine Fisheries Service, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Wild Pit Tag Recoveries At Lower Granite Dam in 1989-90 (unpublished manuscript).
96. See BALANCING FISH AND PowER, supra note 70, at 99-100.
97. See id.at 90-93 (discussing the proposals developed by the tribes' hydrologist that led to the Water Budget concept); cf.supra text accompanying note 69.
98. See id. at 101-02 (discussing a proposal by the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission that would have set higher initial budget amounts, then
lower the amounts in successive dry water years as follows: 2.1 maf at Lower
Granite and 5.2 ma! at Priest Rapids during the first year; 1.2 maf at Lower Granite and 3.5 maf at Priest Rapids during the second year of a dry spell; and 0 at
Lower Granite and 3.5 maf at Priest Rapids in the third year. The costs of this
budget were estimated at 760 megawatts, about 200 megawatts more than the
Original cost estimate of the Council's budget).
99. Id. at 102.
100. 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 85, § 304(a)(2). These flows were set at 76
kcfs at Priest Rapids and between 50 and 65 kcfs, depending on the time, at
Lower Granite.
101. See infra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
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mended operating priorities, giving Water Budget flows preference over reservoir refill and secondary power sales,",2 were frequently ignored by power system operators.103 Moreover, the
Council proved unwilling to specify how budget flows were to be
supplied.'" Consequently, Water Budget implementation proved
to be problematic,"" especially on the Snake, where budget
amounts were already too low and the fish runs were in the worst
shape.11 Within a decade, these runs would again be considered
for protection under the ESA.es
The Water Budget was not the only mainstem passage measure in the 1982 program. The Council also called for mechanical
bypass systems to improve juvenile passage at five public utility
district dams on the mainstem Columbia by 1987.1" Pending bypass installation, the program directed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to require sufficient spills to ensure
survival rates "comparable" to the best available bypass systems
and prescribed minimum spill levels.'" But the Council set no
deadline for installing bypass systems on Corps dams on the
Snake and lower Columbia,'" perhaps recognizing installation as
ultimately a function of congressional appropriations. Nor did the
Council establish any minimum interim spill rates for these mainstem federal dams, although it did require spill plans to achieve
111
survival rates comparable to the best available bypass systems.
102. 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 85, § 304(a)(8).
103. See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
104. For example, the Council did "not express an opinion" as to whether
Idaho Power Company's reservoirs on the middle Snake would contribute to the
Water Budget. 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 85, § 304(a)(5).
105. See Parity IV, supra note 32, at 494-501 (discussing Water Budget implementation during 1984-85).
106. See supra notes 31-32, 93 and accompanying text. The fishery agencies
recognized the inadequacy of the Snake River budget even before the Council
promulgated its program. See BALANCING FISH AND POWER, supra note 70, at 104
(discussing a fishery agency request to increase the Snake River budget by 7 kcfsmonths, to 27 kcfs-months, which was rejected by the Council).
107. See infra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
108. See 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 85, § 404(a)(1)-(3) (calling on the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to require the utilities to take such
action).
109. The prescribed minimums were at least 20% of the average daily flow for
any 30 days of the 60-day downstream migrant season. Id. § 404(a)(10).
110. See id. § 404(b).
111. See id. § 404(b)(3), (9)-(10) (spill plans for John Day, Lower Monumen-
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The vagueness in these spill provisions haunted the program for
years, ultimately prompting a lawsuit to resolve the.issue.11 2
The 1982 program also included measures aimed at (1) improving the effectiveness of upstream passage of adult fish over
fish ladders,118 (2) pressuring ocean harvest managers to ensure
that an adequate number of adult fish escaped to the river,11' (3)
revising operating procedures at two dams in Montana to benefit
resident fish (Montana has no anadromous fish),"' (4) authorizing studies to develop other fish and wildlife measures,1 6 and (5)
giving special attention to restoration in central Washington's
117
Yakima Basin.
An important aspect of the program was its preference for
propagation measures restoring wild stocks of fish. 1 Here, the
Council deviated from the fishery agency recommendations,
which emphasized reliance on hatcheries as well as habitat improvements to restore run sizes.1 1 ' In addition, the program included fish and wildlife conditions that all new Columbia Basin
hydroelectric projects must meet and promised to designate
stream reaches where no hydroelectric development should be allowed.13 0 Finally, the Council instructed BPA to pursue "the most
tal, and Ice Harbor Dams).
112. Idaho v. Herrington, No. 87-7704 (9th Cir. 1987); National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. 87-7705 (9th Cir. 1987). See infra notes.
250-56 and accompanying text.
113. See Parity III, supra note 51, at 310-12 (discussing 1982 PROGRAM,
supra note 85, §§ 600-604).
114. See id. at 328-31 (discussing §§ 500-504).
115. See id. at 331-32 (discussing § 804(b)(1)-(2)).
116. See id. at 332-35.
117. See id. at 320-28, 346-51 (discussing §§ 900-904 and analyzing problems
encountered in funding these measures, largely due to BPA recalcitrance).

118. 1982

PROGRAM,

supra note 85, § 701.

119. See Parity III, supra note 51, at 314-16 (discussing 1982 PROGRAM,
supra note 85, § 702). This deviation from the fishery agency recommendations
was not inconsistent with the deference principle we espouse because Council deference is inappropriate when the fishery experts disagree. In their recommendations, the tribes called for a preference for wild stocks, while the fishery agencies
advocated greater reliance on hatcheries. With a disagreement among the experts,
the Council could resolve the issue in favor of the tribes without violating the
deference principle. See Parity III, supra note 51, at 284 n.41.
120. See id. at 338-42 (discussing 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 85, § 1204(a)-
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expeditious means" for funding program measures"' and defined

the statutory requirement that federal water managers "take [the
12
program] into account . . . to the fullest extent practicable. '
According to the Council, this statutory provision requires federal
agencies to provide either plans indicating they will implement
program measures, or written explanations, with supporting infor-

mation, why implementation would be physically, legally, or otherwise impractical, including all possible allowances to permit implementation. 11 Unfortunately, the agencies and the Council
routinely ignored this provision.
C.

The 1984 Amendments

In 1984, the Council approved a comprehensive set of program amendments after only two years of program implementa-

tion. Most of the amendments were designed to increase the program's specificity, a reflection of the fact that ambiguous language
in the 1982 program frequently caused the federal water managers to disagree with the fishery agencies and tribes over the pace

of funding, the scientific basis for action, and the anticipated biological consequences. 124 Consequently, the 1984 amendments to
the program included a five-year "Action Plan" establishing numerous deadlines for implementing program provisions."", Also,

in light of BPA's ineffective supervision of studies that would en6
the 1984 amendable the Council to establish program goals,"
12 7

ments set three interim program goals.

121. 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 85, § 1304(e)(2). BPA's failure to implement
this measure is recounted in Parity III, supra note 51, at 344-51.
122. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii) (1988).
123. 1982 PROGRAM, supra note 85, § 1304(a)(5). See also 1987 PROGRAM,
supra note 14, § 1304(a)(4)(B), at 150.

124.

NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL,

1984

COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH

1501 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 PROGRAM].
125. See id. § 1503 (effectively reorganizing the program into 11 "Action
Items." Id. § 1504). See generally Restoring Columbia Basin Salmon Under the
Northwest Power Act, ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO, June 1985, at 5-7 (issue 30,
Nat. Resources L. Inst.) [hereinafter Restoring Columbia Basin Salmon]; Parity
IV, supra note 32, at 474-79.
126. See Parity III, supra note 51, at 291 n.58.
127. The interim goals were: (1) to increase the quality and quantity of
salmon and steelhead produced in the Columbia Basin by providing Water Budget
flows, by protecting against adverse effects of new hydroelectric development and
by increasing systemwide productive capacity; (2) to protect ratepayer investment
AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM §
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However, the principal thrust of the 1984 amendments was to
improve fish passage efficiency at mainstem dams. Efficient fish
passage is critical to the program's success because investments in
habitat and fish flows cannot materially increase run sizes without
significant reductions in fish mortality at mainstem dams. For example, if ninety percent of Snake River downstream migrating juvenile fish survive each of eight mainstem dams, the cumulative
systemwide survival rate is only around forty-three percent of the
total run. Mainstem passage survival can be improved in four
ways: (1) by installing mechanical bypass systems to keep juvenile
fish out of the dams' power turbines, (2) by providing spills of
water to pass fish around the dams, (3) by increasing flows to accelerate fish movement through reservoirs (where mortalities also
occur), and (4) by barging and trucking fish downstream, thereby
avoiding subsequent dams and reservoirs. The 1984 amendments
concentrated on the first solution by setting deadlines for installing bypass systems at several mainstem dams."2 8
The Council expected new bypass facilities to enable ninety
percent of the fish to pass each mainstem dam successfully.' At
the time, the existing state-of-the-art facilities at McNary Dam
provided an eighty-five percent survival rate.180 In addition, the
1984 amendments required the Corps of Engineers either to
achieve an eighty-five percent survival rate at Bonneville Dam's
second powerhouse, or to shut the project down during the downstream migration.8 1 So far, the Corps' inability to achieve the
in the program by improving harvest controls and monitoring the effectiveness of
program measures; and (3) to proceed with wildlife and resident fish measures

only where they do not conflict with anadromous fish measures. 1984 PROGRAM,
supra note 124, § 102.

128. In § 1504, the 1984 Program enumerated numerous "Action Items", including the following subsections: 32.5 ("complete bypass system installation at

John Day Dam by the end of Mar. 30, 1986"); 32.12 and 32.13 (install bypass
renovation at Rocky Reach and Wells Dams by Mar. 20, 1987); 32.9 (complete
bypass installation at Little Goose Dam by the end of fiscal year 1987); 32.11

(complete bypass installation at Priest Rapids and Wanapam Dams by Mar. 20,
1988); 32.4, 32.7 and 32.8 (complete bypass installation at The Dalles, Ice Harbor
and Lower Monumental by the end of fiscal year 1989). No specific date for bypass installation at Rock Island Dam was established. See id. § 1504 (Action Item
32.12).
129. Id. § 403.
130. Id. § 404(b)(5)(B).
131. Id. Although designed to be state-of-the-art, the second powerhouse
achieved only a 14-35% fish passage efficiency (i.e., 14-35% of the fish avoid the
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continues to force closures at the
eighty-five percent 1 standard
2
second powerhouse.

3

Although scheduling new bypass installation and requiring
that Bonneville Dam's second powerhouse to meet state-of-theart results, the 1984 amendments did little to improve fish passage at dams without bypass systems because the Council failed
to set an adequate spill requirement. The amendments called
only for a ninety percent survival rate at each mainstem dam.
This standard is less stringent than one based on bypass efficiency, because not all juvenile fish passing through power turbines perish. Moreover, the survival rate approach is more difficult to monitor and control, and, according to the fishery agencies
and the tribes, the ninety percent rate supplied inadequate protection."' In fact, they asserted that the ninety percent survival
standard effectively supplied no greater protection than preNorthwest Power Act operations.18 ' Even some of the means to
achieve this standard, such as the systemwide fish passage plans
developed by the Corps of Engineers and the fishery agencies, 8 8
turbines) prior to 1984. On the relationship between passage efficiency and survival rates, see infra notes 133-34, 195-96 and accompanying text. The required
85% survival rate is subject to exemptions to 1) provide adequate fish passage
conditions as determined by the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes; 2) conduct
research designed to correct fish passage problems; or 3) meet firm power demands that cannot be met elsewhere in the regional power system. See 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 403(b)(6)(B), at 71.
132. See Letter from John Smith, Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Auth., to
Brig. Gen. Pat Stevens, IV, Army Corps of Eng'rs, N. Pac. Div. (Feb. 5, 1990);
Letter from John Donaldson, Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Auth., to Col.
William Kakel, Army Corps of Eng'rs, N. Pac. Div. (Feb. 8,1991). In comments on
a draft of this article, Brian Brown noted that research has identified a number of
structural modifications that would substantially improve fish passage at Bonneville second powerhouse. However, although the fishery agencies and tribes have
sought these modifications since 1988, the Corps has yet to take action. Letter
from Brian Brown, National Marine Fisheries Serv., to Michael Blumm (April 4,
1991).
133. See Lothrop, The Failure of the Fish Passage Provisions of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program and Some Suggested Remedies, ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO, Nov. 1985, at 4 (issue no. 34, Nat. Resources L. Inst.). WATER
BUDGET CENTER, WATER BUDGET MANAGERS SUMMARY REPORT OF JUVENILE MITI-

OPERATIONS APRIL-JUNE 1985 at 6 (alleging that a 90% survival standard
does "not provide protection above a no spill, no bypass alternative").
134. See Fish Law Briefs, ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO, July 1986, at 11-12
(issue no. 36, Nat. Resources L. Inst.)thereinafter Fish Law Briefs].
135. 1984 PROGRAM, supra note 124, § 1504 (Action Item 32.2).
GATION
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proved to be controversial. Actually, the Council's ninety percent
survival standard seemed inconsistent with the statutory directive
of producing "improved survival of... [anadromous] fish at hydroelectric facilities located on the Columbia river system."' 3 6
The 1984 amendments also established twenty-seven new
habitat improvement and passage restoration projects. In addition, they set deadlines for a number of major capital projects,
including hatcheries in the Yakima Basin and on the Umatilla
Indian Reservation, acclimation ponds at John Day Dam, and a
low capital propagation program on the Nez Perce Indian Reservation.137 Nevertheless, habitat improvement and artificial propagation initiatives without mainstem passage improvements will
not materially increase run sizes.'"
D.

The 1985 Amendments

Formal program amendments"' were not scheduled until
1987. However, in 1985 and again in 1986, the Council was forced
to shore up deficiencies in its program through unscheduled
amendments. The first, approved in February 1985, eliminated
BPA as a funding source for the "goals" studies. 40 This amendment thrust the Council into the role of overseeing the historical,
anthropological, and biological studies necessary to establish program goals in the wake of its rejection of the fishery coalition's
recommended "pre-McNary" goal. M Arguably, the Council
should have assumed that role from the outset because BPA's
commitment to a strong fish restoration program has always been
suspect." 2
136. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(i) (1988).
137. 1984 Program,supra note 124, (Action Items 34.12-.14). See also Parity
IV, supra note 32, at 476-77.
138. Cf. supra note 133 and accompanying text.
139. Formal amendments require the Council to solicit recommendations
from interested parties, make a preliminary decision on those recommendations it
will propose, then submit its proposal for public review and comment. Id. §
839b(h)(2)-(4).
140. Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,032
(1985) (final amendments; amending § 201 of the program). See Restoring Basin
Salmon, supra note 125, at 5.
141. See supra notes 72-73, 86-87 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 32, at 173 (discussing BPA's
delaying of implementation of program measures on cost-benefit grounds).
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The 1985 amendment produced results relatively quickly. In
September 1985, the Council staff released a draft report detailing historic records of fish run sizes, and comparing them to current run sizes.1 3 In March 1986, the Council released its final report, in which it estimated predevelopment average annual run
sizes of ten to sixteen million, dwarfing current run sizes of
around 2.5 million.14 ' Those estimates suggest a net basin-wide
loss of seven to fourteen million fish and thirty-one percent loss
of habitat due to water project development (thirty-eight percent
above Bonneville Dam). The report found that upper basin losses
remain "largely unmitigated" and attributed the decline principally to the severe cumulative affects imposed on juvenile and
adult fish that must pass up to nine dams between spawning
grounds and the ocean. Seventy-seven to ninety-six percent of the
juveniles perish, while thirty-seven to fifty-one percent of the
adults fail to survive the hydroelectric system. 14 5 A subsequent
staff issue paper estimated that five to eleven million of the 1total
losses were due to hydropower development and operations. "
E. The 1986 Amendments
The unscheduled 1986 amendments concerned an attempt by
the fishery agencies and tribes to strengthen one of the program's
weakest links-its spill provisions. The Council reconsidered its
1985 spill provisions in response to a fishery agency and tribal
request. The agencies and tribes claimed their recommendation
would improve fish survival by half over the program's ninety
percent survival standard. However, the Council rejected the recommendation, asserting it would be too expensive and complicated to implement. 7 Instead, in December of 1985, the Council
proposed increasing its survival standard to ninety-five percent in
143. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 10-11
(1986) (describing the Council's Draft Compilation of Information on Salmon and
Steelhead Losses in the Columbia River Basin) [hereinafter 1986 ANNUAL
REPORT].

144. LossEs STUDY, supra note 21, at 4.
145. Id. at 5. These figures assume juvenile mortalities of 15-30% per dam,
and adult mortalities of 5-10% per dam.

146.

NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, HYDROPOWER RESPONSIBILITY FOR

(1986). See also
1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 203(b), at 36.
147. See generally Fish Law Briefs, supra note 134, at 11-13.
SALMON AND STEELHEAD LOSSES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 1
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high or average water years and ninety-two percent in below average water years.1'4
However, two months later, in February 1986, the Council rejected its own staff's recommendations and backed off from its
proposal. Instead, the 1986 amendment retained the existing
ninety percent survival standard on the grounds that the Council
could not determine that the staff proposal would produce "significant biological benefits.I' ' However, the amendment did extend the spill season through August 15, as necessary to protect
wild summer and fall chinook runs, and clarified that the spill
program was to operate regardless of any effects on firm power.150
The 1986 amendment also called on fishery agencies and tribes to
set criteria guaranteeing sufficient spill at mainstem dams to protect eighty percent of the typical downstream migrations. But the
Council did not expressly require the Corps and the fishery agencies and tribes to agree on a spill program, as the agencies and
tribes had requested."' 1
With no spill program in 1986, the Corps accepted some of
the spill criteria of the agencies and tribes and implemented some
of its own."' The Council did nothing to prevent the Corps from
rejecting the fishery agencies' and tribes' spill criteria. However, it
later noted that "the Corps explained why it did not adopt the
criteria of the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes but did not
explain why their criteria were impracticable, as called for in section 4(h)(11) of the Northwest Power Act.' 5 3 Unfortunately, the
Council suggested no remedy for the Corps' violation of the statute, a reflection of the low priority given to enforcing its own
program.
The 1986 amendments displayed a Council unwilling to heed
148.

NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE INTERIM FISH PAS-

2 (1985). See Lothrop, supra note 133, at 5.
149. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, NOTICE OF FINAL AMENDMENTS 37-39 (1986) (amending §§ 304, 404 and 1504 of the program)[hereinafter

SAGE OBjEcTIvEs

FINAL AMENDMENTS].

150. See generally ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO, July 1986 (issue no. 36, Nat.
Resources L. Inst.).
151. The Corps' propensity to "consider" fishery agency and tribal spill programs, but then develop its own spill program, was a longstanding problem. See
Lothrop, supra note 133, at 4-5.
152. 1986 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 7.
153. Id.
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the biological opinion of the fishery agencies and tribes that increased spill would produce significant biological benefits. The
Council disagreed, largely on the basis of computer models showing that anticipated high reservoir mortality rates would overshadow the benefits of increased spills. 1" Despite acknowledging
the uncertain nature of the biological and economic estimates of
the models, the Council relied heavily on the Corps' studies.
Moreover, by effectively overruling the fishery agency and tribal
conclusions regarding the biological benefits increased spills
would produce, the Council seemed to forget that Congress did
not want the Council to be a super fish and wildlife agency. 8 5
Consequently, six years after Congress called for a Columbia Basin fishery restoration program, the program it authorized offered
no significant improvement in fish passage at mainstem dams, a
result inconsistent with a specific statutory directive.'"
F. The 1987 Amendments
The 1987 amendments established a new framework for implementing the program. The new framework sought to account
for the detrimental effects of hydropower on salmon and steelhead at each stage of their lives. It included fish passage, fish production, and harvest management provisions, and it prescribed
coordinated research and evaluation efforts.157 At the core of the
154. See FINAL AMENDMENTS, supra note 149, at 25. The Council did properly
reject an argument by BPA's Direct Service Industries (mostly aluminum companies) that a formal cost-benefit analysis was the proper litmus test to evaluate
alternative approaches to improve fish survival. Id. at 28-30. On the inappropriateness of employing a cost-benefit test, see Parity II, supra note 46, at 135-39,
147-52; Public Util. Dist. No. I of Chelan County, 34 F.E.R.C. 1 63,044 (Jan. 8,
1986) (FERC Administrative Law Judge's rejection of a cost-benefit test, discussed in Fish Law Briefs, supra note 134; see generally Lothrop, The Misplaced
Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Columbia Basin Fishery Mitigation, 16 ENVTL. L.
517 (1986).
155. 126 CONG. REC. H29,810 (Nov. 17, 1980) (remarks of Cong. Dingell). Section 4(h)(7) of the Northwest Power Act requires the Council to give "due weight"
to the expertise of the fishery agencies and tribes in formulating the Columbia
Basin Program. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7). However, the Council alleged that the fishery agencies' and tribes' spill proposal was not a "recommendation that triggers on
the procedural requirements of the Northwest Power Act." FINAL AMENDMENTS,
supra note 149, at 19. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b4(h)(7) (1988).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34 (no increased fish protection).
Cf. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(i) (calling for improved fish passage).
157. 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 202, at 35.
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new system was a subbasin planning effort aimed at identifying
objectives and constraints on local fish production, as well as ensuring integration of program goals and policies.'" However, the
amendments avoided making any significant improvements in the
program's troubled mainstem passage provisions.
1. Setting Interim Goals
At the center of the Council's new framework was an interim
goal to double existing fish runs from approximately 2.5 million to
five million annually.'1" This target was based on the Council's
1986 losses study which estimated that hydropower was responsible for five to ten million of the seven to fourteen million fish lost
annually as a result of habitat-damaging development activities
throughout the Columbia Basin.1 60 Although the Council fixed hydropower-related losses at approximately eight million fish per
year,' s1 it adopted the lesser goal of doubling run sizes on the
grounds that current socioeconomic and biological conditions reduce the possibility of restoring fish runs to historic levels."' The
Council deferred setting a target date for achieving 63
the interim
goal until completion of its subbasin planning effort.1
2. Systemwide and Subbasin Planning
As early as 1982,164 the Council recognized that increasing
run sizes required more than just improving mainstem passage
and developing fish production and harvest management strategies.' 66 Effective restoration required a coordinated, systemwide
effort.' " Consequently, in 1987, as a result of the recommenda158. Id. § 205, at 44.

159. Id. § 203, at 35.
160. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.

161. Of the 8 million in annual losses, half are due to the loss of access to
habitat above Chief Joseph Dam on the Columbia and Hells Canyon Dam on the
Snake. An additional 4 million fish perish as a result of mainstem passage. See
1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 203(b)(2), at 38.

162. Id. at 39. The Northwest Power Act limits ratepayer responsibility for
fish losses to those losses attributable'to hydropower. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(8)(B)
(1988).
163. See infra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
164. See supra text preceding note 87.
165. 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 204, at 39.
166. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, SALMON AND STEELHEAD SYSTEM
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tions of one of its advisory committees, the Fish Propagation
approach
Panel, the Council adopted a comprehensive, 1integrated
67
to the Columbia Basin hydroelectric system.
The Columbia Basin comprises a multitude of distinct watersheds. Each watershed harbors fish populations likely to be genetically distinct.1 " Thus, the key to a successfully integrated system
plan is developing individual plans tailored to the unique needs
and opportunities of each watershed within the basin. Accordingly, the 1987 amendments called for subbasin planning to guide
future propagation efforts1 "9for thirty-one watersheds in the Columbia Basin.17 Subbasin plans establish guiding principles for
salmon and steelhead research171 and resident fish substitutions.1 7' Additionally, they set subbasin production objectives,
such as the number of fish desired for harvest and conservation.
To facilitate that effort, the Council adopted a set of policies
to guide planning and implementing program measures.173 These
policies included giving priority to the areas above Bonneville
Dam, ensuring genetic diversity, and expeditiously improving
mainstem passage.1 "
In addition, the amendments called for yearly round-table
discussions between hydropower operators, hatchery operators,
harvest managers, water managers, fish habitat managers, BPA,
3 (1990) [hereinafter SYSTEM PLANNING REPORT].
167. 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 204(f), at 42.
168. See infra notes 228-36 and accompanying text.
169. 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 205, at 44. The Council had rejected
subbasin planning in 1984. See Regional Council Proposes 5-Year Action Plan
and Other Amendments to the Columbia Basin Program, ANADROMOUS FISH. L.
MEMO, Aug. 1984, at 8 (issue no. 27, Nat. Resources L. Inst.).
170. Each subbasin is a major tributary or a mainstem segment of either the
Columbia or Snake River. SYSTEM PLANNING REPORT, supra note 166, at 4.
171. 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 206, at 45.
172. The program's resident fish substitutions policy is intended to mitigate
losses of anadromous fish in areas of the basin that are blocked to fish migration
(areas above Chief Joseph and Grand Coulee Dams and the Hells Canyon Complex). Id. § 207, at 49. See also id. § 903(g), at 125.
173. Id. § 204, at 39.
174. Id. § 204(a)-(c), at 39-40. The other policies were to (1) use a mix of
wild, natural, and hatchery production to increase harvests, (2) request harvest
management entities to regulate harvests to support the program's goal, and (3)
coordinate mainstem passage improvement with fish production and harvest management. Id. § 204(d)-(f), at 41-42.
PLANNING STATUS REPORT
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and the Council to review program goals and evaluate program
implementation. 7 " The Council envisions a final integrated plan
encompassing all of the anadromous fish policies and programs
affecting the Columbia Basin, including those of the fishery agencies and the Indian tribes.17 The Council expects to adopt an integrated system plan before the end of 1991.17
3. Fish Flows
The 1987 amendments again did nothing to improve fish
flows. When first approved in 1982, the Water Budget was heralded as the program's centerpiece and promised a fundamental
shift in hydroelectric system planning and operating priorities.7
Regrettably, this promise has never been fulfilled. 17' In fact, implementing the Water Budget seems to have actually impaired
summer migrating fish, since the Corps and BPA typically respond to the end of the Water Budget season in mid-June by reducing summer flows in order to store water for power sales in the
fall and winter.180 Reducing summer flows in this manner may reduce the cost of the Water Budget, but it also results in a marked
reduction in flows during the summer migration season.
Moreover, the Water Budget has regularly gone unimplemented. For example, in 1985, the first year of the program in
which flows were not above average, Water Budget requests on
the Snake River were met on only six days during a twenty-six
day period. 18' This failure was due to (1) the Corps' and BPA's
shaping of requested flows to maximize power sales, (2) disagreements between budget managers and the Corps over how to account for budget use, (3) the Corps' flood control operations
which preempted budget use, and (4) the priority both agencies
175. Id. § 204(g), at 44.
176. SYSTEM PLANNING REPORT, supra note 166, at 9.
177. Id. at 12.
178. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
179. See generally Parity IV, supra note 32, at 494-501 (reviewing the 198485 seasons; the 1986 season was one of high flows, and therefore not indicative of
the Water Budget's efficacy).
180. BPA considers such action authorized by § 303(a)(4) of the Program,
which encourages power managers to seek creative ways to minimize the costs of
implementing the Water Budget. 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 303(a)(4), at 56.
181. See Parity IV, supra note 32, at 497 (citing WATER BUDGET CENTER.
1985 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (Aug. 1985)).
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gave to refilling reservoirs over meeting budget requests.1 " Because the Water Budget is very much a compromise measure, "8
the failure to implement an arguably inadequate budget was particularly disturbing.
By giving priority to secondary energy sales and reservoir refill over budget flows, the Corps and BPA clearly violated the Columbia Basin Program.'" In 1987, the fishery agencies and tribes
sought to encourage the Council to enforce its program by establishing a new dispute resolution process. However, the Council rejected this recommendation, asserting that existing program measures were more effective in resolving disputes. " "
The Council also rejected a fishery agency recommendation
that BPA provide an annual report of its power marketing operations during the Water Budget period. The Council noted that
the program already required this information."" But acknowledging that BPA failed to supply such reports in the past, the
Council requested BPA to make power marketing information
available to the fishery agencies and tribes, and to the Council as
1 87

well.

The fishery agencies and tribes chose to negotiate to resolve
Snake River Water Budget flows instead of seeking a 1987 program amendment.'" However, they did seek an amendment to
assure that Water Budget accounting would take place on an average daily basis.180 Instead, the Council established an accounting system based on a weekly average basis, while imposing a flow
fluctuation limit of eighty percent on weekends and holidays. 190
182. See Lothrop, supra note 133, at 5-6.
183. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
184. See 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 303(a)(8), at 57.
185. See id. app. C at 21, 28.
186. See 1984 PROGRAM, supra note 124, § 1503 (calling for annual reports on,
among other subjects, mainstem passage and Water Budget implementation).
187. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1986 DRAFT AMENDMENT
DOCUMENT 166 (1986).

188. See

COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE COUNCIL & COLUMBIA RIVER IN-

TER-TRIBAL FISH COMM'N, RESTORATION OF UPRIVER RUNS OF SALMON AND STEEL-

HEAD IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 9 (1986) (briefing paper distributed at public
workshop held in Portland, Or. on Sept. 27, 1986) [hereinafter BRIEFING PAPER].
189. See 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, app. C at 25. For background on the
accounting controversy, see Parity IV, supra note 32, at 498 n.190.
190. See 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, app. C at 12.
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The Council asserted that average weekly flows, coupled with the
fluctuation limits, would be as biologically effective as average
daily flows and would cost less. 1°1
The Council's approach to flows in 1987, like its approach to
spills the previous year, was to reject recommendations of the
fishery agencies and tribes that would impose additional costs on
the hydroelectric system. The rationale was not that the recommendations would jeopardize an economical or reliable power
supply,1" but rather on the ground that its solutions would produce biological results similar to the recommendations. The
Council thus seemed to have anointed itself a super fish and wildlife agency, in defiance of congressional will. 1 " This arrogance
was also evident in the Council's spill decision of 1987.
4. Fish Spills
Improved mainstem passage is a critical factor in increasing
fish run sizes. Investments in habitat improvements and fish flows
cannot materially increase run sizes unless fish mortality at mainstem dams is significantly reduced. '" Numerous juveniles perish
as they pass downstream through power turbines.195 Spills of
water are essential to reduce turbine-related mortality at dams
that are not equipped with protective screens and effective
mechanical bypass systems.'" In their recommendations to the
Council, the fishery agencies and tribes contended that unless
spills were increased, the program's goal of restoring wild upriver
runs would be impossible to achieve.19
Prior to the 1987 amendments, the fishery agencies and
tribes tried unsuccessfully to convince the Council to increase
191. Id.
192. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(5) (1988).
193. See supra notes 49, 60, 155 and accompanying text.

194. For example, even if 80% of migrating juveniles survive each of eight
dams on their downstream journey, cumulative mortality amounts to 70-80% of
the total run. See Lothrop, supra note 133, at 4.
195. See BREFING PAPER, supra note 188, at 9.

196. The Council acknowledged "unequivocally that spill results in much
lower fish mortality, compared to turbine passage." See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL. DECISION ON LONG-TERM SPILL AMENDMENT AND RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

2 (1989).

197. See

BRIEFING PAPER, supra

note 188, at 10.
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spills at Corps dams on the lower Snake to levels equivalent to
those ordered by a FERC administrative law judge for nonfederal
dams on the mid-Columbia. ' 0s Twice in 1986 the Council rejected
proposals by the fishery agencies and tribes to increase interim
spills at projects without effective bypass facilities. 1" The Council
variously asserted that increased spills "would be less effective
than the adopted provisions," that it did not have time to evaluate the proposed changes, and that it did not want to interfere
with ongoing spill negotiations (which eventually would produce
an agreement the next year). 00 The Council also contended that
cumulative reservoir mortalities would negate the biological benefits of increased spill levels. 01
By rejecting the spill recommendation, the Council seemed to
consider the function of interim spills to be limited to providing
protection against catastrophic losses in low water years.' 0 ' The
biological foundation for this conclusion remains obscure. If it intends to function as a super fish and wildlife agency, the Council
should explain the biological basis for its decisions. It should also
explain how its decisions complement existing and future activities of the fishery agencies and tribes, as the Northwest Power
Act requires.' 0 '
The 1987 amendments authorized summer spills, provided
for spills irrespective of firm power commitments, and called on
the Corps to make spill decisions on the basis of criteria. devel198. See Bodi, FERC's Mid-Columbia Proceeding: Ten Years and Still
Counting, 16 ENvm. L. 555 (1986). The spill programs for four of the five
nonfederal projects have an objective of 50% passage efficiency (that is, 50% of
juvenile fish avoid the power turbines). In contrast, the Council's 90% survival
standard for Corps projects requires a passage efficiency of approximately only
40%. The 90% survival standard means that about 40% of upriver Snake smolts
will survive to below Bonneville Dam. See BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 188, at 1011. The fishery agencies and tribes tried to convince the Council to require spills
at federal projects equivalent to those at the FERC-licensed projects in early 1986.
See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
199. The agencies and tribes recommended increasing interim spills to 31%
of the average daly flow at Lower Monumental Dam and 41% at Ice Harbor and
The DallesDams. See 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, app. C at 25.
200. Id.
201. See Parity IV, supra note 32, at 483-85 (describing the Council's reasoning in rejecting the proposed amendment of the fishery agencies and tribes in February 1986).
202. See id.
203. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(A) (1988).
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oped by the fishery agencies and tribes.' °4 However, all of these
measures were simply reiterations of decisions made in February
1986.205 The 1987 amendments provided no additional protection.
The Council also rejected a fishery agency and tribal proposal
that would have required the Corps, the fishery agencies, and the
tribes to agree jointly on an annual fish passage plan.'" This rejection invited a repetition of the unhappy events of 1986, when
and tribal spill criteria requests without
the Corps refused agency
07
adequate explanations.
Another fishery agency and tribal recommendation that the
Council rejected was a dispute resolution provision aimed at
speeding up implementation of program measures.'"3 This
amendment would have required the Council to investigate and
make a report within sixty days of receiving an allegation that a
program measure was not being implemented. The Council
claimed that the recommendation would be less effective than existing measures.' 0' Yet this assertion ignored the growing evidence that those measures failed to produce timely program
implementation." 0
5. Juvenile Fish Transportation
The Corps of Engineers has always favored increased reliance
on barge and truck transportation as a substitute for instream
fish passage. Trucking or barging juvenile fish reduces pressure to
spill or install juvenile bypass facilities, both of which are expensive. In low flow years, transportation on the Snake has in fact
204. 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 403(b), at 67.
205. See Parity IV, supra note 32, at 483 n.123, 484 nn.126-28.
206. See The Failed Promise of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program and What to Do About It, ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO, Nov. 1986, at 7 n.79
(issue no. 38, Nat. Resources L. Inst.).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53. Late in 1986, the Council
acknowledged that the Corps' 1986 spill passage plan was "largely inconsistent"
with the program. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, QUARTERLY REPORT
ON IMPLEMENTATION OF FIVE-YEAR ACTION PLAN 3 (1986) [hereinafter QUARTERLY
REPORT].

208. 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, app. C at 14.
209. Id. at 28.
210. See, e.g., supra notes 152-56, supra notes 181-85, and accompanying
text. See also The Failed Promise, supra note 206, at 7 n.83.
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benefitted the fish runs, particularly steelhead.2' 1 However, spring

chinook have not responded well to transportation. In years with
higher flows, chinook survive better if left in-river than if trucked
or barged.212 Moreover, the fishery agencies and tribes believe
that transportation can never substitute for safe passage conditions at individual projects, because substantial numbers of fish
cannot be captured and transported. Further, they cite a lack of
studies correlating transported fish with adult returns and fear
that transported fish suffer from stress that adversely affects
218
them after their release in the lower river.
In 1987, the Corps proposed a "full transportation" amendment that would maximize use of transportation for all species
under all flow conditions. The Council rejected this amendment
because it would take the fishery agencies and tribes out of the
decision-making process on transportation, inconsistent with provisions of both the program and the Act."2' This rejection seemed
to affirm that the fishery agencies and tribes possess the biologi16
cal expertise and legal authority to set transportation policy.2
Thus, the policy of the agencies and tribes, which is to maximize
transportation of all stocks in average or below average water conditions but to minimize transportation of spring chinook in above
average flows, s" 6 is likely to continue.
The Council also rejected a Corps amendment that would
have given the Corps transportation credits"17 that could reduce
instream migration protection. The Council considered the proposal likely to reduce juvenile survival and therefore inconsistent
with a number of statutory provisions.""
211. See BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 188, at 12.
212. Id.

213. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, MINUTES FOR
100, at 19 (1986) (testimony of Fred Olney and Doug DeHart).
214. See The Failed Promise, supra note 206, at 8 n.87.

MEETING No.

215. 1987 PROGRAM,supra note 14, app. C at 15.
216. See BRIEFING

PAPER,

supra note 188, at 12.

217. The proposed amendment would have permitted crediting of transporta-

tion to individual project survival goals. 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, app. C. at
26.
218. See The Failed Promise, supra note 206, at 1, 8 n.90.
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Bypass Installation

Turbine passage kills approximately ten to thirty percent of
juvenile fish per dam. In contrast, passage through a mechanical
bypass system or over a spillway kills only about one to two percent of the migrants. 19 In the long run, installing mechanical bypass systems is a key to improving survival at dams and restoring
upriver fish runs. In the interim, sufficient spills are necessary.
Spills are the most biologically benign way of passing juvenile fish

safely at dams, but the water spilled cannot be used to generate
power because it is not passed through the turbines. Spills, there-

fore, are only an interim solution to fish mortality at dams.
Mechanical bypass systems provide a better long-term solution
because they provide safe passage without materially reducing hydropower generation.
Of the thirteen mainstem dams on the Columbia and Snake

which anadromous fish pass, only six are equipped with adequate
juvenile bypass systems.3 0 The bypass system at Bonneville
Dam's second powerhouse has proven to be particularly problematic. ""' Moreover, recent studies raised serious doubts about the

efficacy of Bonneville's first powerhouse.' Bypass installation
schedules at the seven projects without adequate bypass systems
have continuously slipped, generally by two to three years. 3 According to the 1988 spill agreement,2" expected bypass installa-

tion dates for Lower Monumental, Ice Harbor, and The Dalles are,
now 1992, 1993, and 1994, respectively.22s
219. See BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 188, at 9.
220. Wells (on the mid-Columbia); Little Goose and Lower Granite (on the
Snake); and McNary, John Day, and Bonneville first powerhouse (on the lower
Columbia).
221. See supra note 132.
222. See BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 188, at 9.
223. Id. See QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 207.
224. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Bonneville Power Admin. & Confederated Tribes
of the Yakima Indian Nation, FIsH SPILL MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (1989)
[hereinafter FISH SPILL MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT], reprinted in FIsH PASSAGE
CENTER, Columbia Basin Fish & Wildlife Authority, 1989 FISH PASSAGE MANAGERS
ANNUAL REPORT, app. C-5 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 ANNUAL REPORT].
225. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 224, at C-9. Cf. supra note 128 (original
installation dates). According to Brian Brown, the expected completion date for
the bypass system at The Dalles is now 1998, nearly 20 years after enactment of
the Northwest Power Act. Letter from Brian Brown, National Marine Fisheries
Serv., to Michael Blumm (April 4, 1991).
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Failure to meet scheduled installation dates is largely due to
difficulties in securing congressional appropriations. These difficulties have been exacerbated by the Corps of Engineers' unwillingness to support (and its occasional opposition to) appropriation requests. 2 6 However, in 1990, Congress approved an 18.5
million dollar appropriation for improvements at six Corps
Dams."' In contrast to its inability to secure sufficient mainstem
fish flows, the Council, in conjunction with the region's fishery
agencies and Indian tribes, has shown that it can be a successful
congressional lobbyist for Columbia Basin fish runs.
7. Genetic Diversity
Ecological specialization in Pacific salmonids is highly developed.2 8 As a result, isolating processes have led to genetic diversification among populations,' with the differences between populations having adaptive significance.23 0 Artificial propagation, as
in hatcheries, tends to reduce genetic diversity and increases the
risk of maladaptive genetic drift.3 1 In fact, natural propagation

almost invariably
suffers from attempts to artificially supplement
3
populations.2 2

226. Most of the opposition came from Corps' headquarters .in Washington,
D.C., not from officials in the Pacific Northwest.
227. See H.R. REP. No. 889, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 136 CONG. REC.
H10,379, H10,392 (1990); Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act,
1991, Pub. L. No. 101-514, 104 Stat. 2074 (1990). The six dams are Lower Monumental, Lower Granite, Little Goose, Ice Harbor, The Dalles, and McNary Dams).
Northwest Power Planning Council, News Release (June 13, 1990). See also Crow,
Fish Bypass Funds Begin to Flow, NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS, Mar./Apr. 1990, at
29 (Northwest Power Planning Council).
228. Goodman, supra note 2, at 116.
229. Id. at 119 (citing Bevan, Problems of Managing Mixed-Stock Salmon

Fisheries,in

SALMON PRODUCTION, MANAGEMENT, AND ALLOCATION: BIOLOGICAL,
ONOMIC AND POLICY ISSUES 103, 104 (W. McNeil ed. 1988)).

Ec-

230. Goodman, supra note 2, at 123. For a general discussion on the adaptive

significance of genetic composition of populations, see D.

FUTUYMA, EVOLUTIONARY

(2d ed. 1986). For a discussion on the genetic significance of behavioral
adaptation, see J. ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 55-80
(4th ed. 1989).
231. Goodman, supra note 2, at 123-31.
232. Id. at 164 (citing Reisenbichler and McIntyre, Requirements for Integrating Natural and Artificial Production of Anadromous Salmonids in the PaBIOLOGY

cific Northwest, in

FISH CULTURE IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

372 (R. Stroud ed.

1986)). See also W. Bakke, Review of Scientific Literature on the Supplementa-
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Recognizing that "[c]onservation of unique genetic stocks 33
is

fundamental to the vigor, resiliency and survival of a species,
the Council incorporated into the 1987 program a requirement to
assess the genetic risks of proposed actions.23' The program required BPA to fund studies to ensure maintenance of genetic diversity in spawning stocks 35 and to determine the best methods
for integrating natural and hatchery propagation."'
G.

The 1988 Amendments

In 1988, the Council approved two amendments to the pro-

gram. Both measures promised substantial protection and some
restoration for Columbia Basin anadromous fish.
1. Protected Areas

The first amendment, approved in August 1988, designated
approximately 44,000 miles of streams as "protected areas," re-

stricting future hydroelectric development. 3 7 The Council contion of Anadromous Fish from Hatcheries with Comments for the Northwest
Power Planning Council (Nov. 1987) (unpublished manuscript by the executive
director of Oregon Trout).
233. 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 703(e)(3), at 98.
234. Id. § 204(b), at 40.
235. Id.

236. Id. § 703(h), at 105. The Council intends to defer to the judgment of fish
and wildlife agencies and the Indian tribes to make decisions balancing increased
artificial propagation and natural stocks. Id. § 204(d), at 41.
237. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, PROTECTED AREAS SUMMARY AND
RESPONSE TO COMMENTS (1988) [hereinafter PROTECTED AREAS DESIGNATION]. This
amendment followed studies initiated in 1984, which were called for in the Council's 1982 Program and its 1983 power plan. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1983 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AND ELECTRIC POWER PLAN (1983) [hereinaf-

ter 1983 POWER PLAN]. The 1982 Program called on BPA to conduct an 18-month
study of alternatives for designating certain streams and wildlife habitat in the
Columbia River Basin for protection from future hydroelectric development. The
Council promised that, based on the study, it would designate stream reaches and
wildlife habitat areas to be protected. The 1983 Power Plan called for a regionwide study to rank potential hydropower sites based on fish and wildlife concerns. After two years of study and several months of comment, the Council approved a list of river reaches to be "protected areas." Because the protected areas
and site ranking studies were related, the Council established the Hydropower
Assessment Steering Committee in October 1983 to help coordinate them. Based
on the Committee's work, the Council adopted the Pacific Northwest Hydro As-

sessment Study Work Plan in August 1984. See

PROTECTED AREAS DESIGNATION,
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cluded that hydropower development in these areas would entail
unacceptable harm to critical fish spawning grounds or wildlife
habitat.'" Protected area designation curbs only new hydropower
projects; it does not affect the operation of existing dams, even
where a new hydroelectric project is proposed as a retrofit of an
existing dam.'" Developers may seek an exemption from protected area status for projects with "exceptional fish and wildlife
benefits."''4 0
Protected areas designated in the 1988 amendments are necessarily limited to the Columbia Basin, since the Northwest
Power Act restricts the program to the Columbia Basin.2'4 Furthermore, protected area designation does not absolutely foreclose
hydroelectric development, since the Act only requires federal
agencies like FERC to take the program into account "to the ful' s As a practical matter, however, prolest extent practicable. "''
tected area status will make hydroelectric development
4
difficult.'
The Council also extended protection to river stretches
outside the Columbia Basin but within the Pacific Northwest (for
example, the Puget Sound Basin and the Oregon coast) by
amending the Northwest Power Plan,'4" which is not limited to
supra.
238. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, PROTECTED AREAS AMENDMENTS

AND

RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

(1988)

[hereinafter

PROTECTED

AREAS

AMENDMENTS].

239. The Council was extremely vague about the effect that protected area
designation would have on projects whose applications were pending before FERC
at the time the area was designated. The Council simply noted that some projects
would have already incurred substantial investments and recognized that FERC
"may be obligated to complete its processes on these applications, but urged that,
when possible, protected areas designation be taken into account to the fullest
extent practicable." Id. at ii. See also infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
240. PROTECTED AREA AMENDMENTS, supra note 38, at 17. See infra note 267
on exemptions sought in 1990.
241. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A) (1988).
242. Id. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii).
243. The Columbia Basin Program qualifies as a "comprehensive plan" under
§ 10(a) of the Federal Power Act. See 16 U.S-C. § 803(a). Smith Falls Hydropower,
49 F.E.R.C. 62,305 (Dec. 19, 1989). This means that FERC must consider "[t]he
extent to which the proposed project is consistent with a comprehensive plan." 16
U.S.C. § 803(a)(2)(A). What constraints this provision may impose on FERC discretion remain highly uncertain.
244. The Northwest Power Plan governs BPA's resource acquisitions and is
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the Columbia Basin."25 This means that BPA may not purchase
the output of projects in protected areas outside the Columbia
Basin. However, FERC, the Corps, and the Bureau of Reclamation are not restrained by the Northwest Power Act outside the
boundaries of the Columbia Basin. Thus, FERC recently released
a final environmental impact statement recommending construction of the proposed Salt Caves Hydroelectric Project on the Upper Klamath River in southern Oregon, even though the Upper
Klamath is listed as a protected area in the Northwest Power
4 6
Plan.2

2. UmatiUa River Flow Enhancement
In November 1988, the Council approved an amendment to
the program allowing water to be pumped from the Columbia to
the Umatilla to augment low flows in the Umatilla River.247 Anadromous fish runs in the Umatilla Basin declined partly due to
mortalities at mainstem Columbia dams, but primarily because of
large irrigation withdrawals from the river.
8
The amendments complement the Umatilla Project Act,"

which authorized forty-two million dollars for the Bureau of Reclamation to construct, operate and maintain a flow enhancement
project." The Act directed BPA to provide power to exchange
water in the Columbia for water in the Umatilla in a manner consistent with the Council's program. Water in the Columbia would
be made available for irrigators, who would then leave water in
not limited to the Columbia Basin. See 1986 POWER PLAN, supra note 17, app. 1-C
at 9-13 (amended Sept. 14, 1988 by PROTECTED AREAS AMENDMENTS, supra note
238).
245. 16 U.S.C. § 839a(14) (1988).
246. See OFFICE OF HYDROPOWER LICENSING, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT PROPOSED SALT CAVE HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT

(FERC 10199-000). However, FERC must consider the Klamath's status as a protected area because, like the Columbia Basin
Program, the Northwest Power Plan is a comprehensive plan for purposes of §
10(a) of the Federal Power Act. See supra note 243.
KLAMATH COUNTY, OREGON (1990)

247.

NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, NOTICE OF FINAL AMENDMENTS TO

THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM REGARDING

UMATILLA

RIVER FLOWS (1988) [hereinafter UMATILLA RIVER FLOW AMENDMENTS] (amending

§§ 703(a)(17), 1403(4)).
248. Umatilla Basin Project Act, Pub. L. No. 100-557, 102 Stat. 279 (1988).
249. See id. Both the Act and the Council's amendments are discussed in
UMATILLA RIVER FLOW AMENDMENTS, supra note 247, at 2.
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the depleted Umatilla for fish habitat. The Council's amendment
conformed the program to the Umatilla Project Act by approving
interim pumping, establishing a process to govern long-term
pumping, and calling for Bureau of Reclamation studies monitoring and evaluating the pumping and water conservation measures.
H. The 1989 Amendments
The Council approved two additional amendments in 1989.
In February, the Council adopted the spill agreement negotiated
by the fishery agencies and tribes, which resolved longstanding
disagreements about the magnitude and timing of spills to facilitate fish passage at mainstem dams. In November, the Council
amended the program to establish a basinwide wildlife mitigation
program.
1. Ratifying the Spill Agreement
In late 1988, the fishery agencies and tribes concluded a yearlong negotiation with BPA and the Pacific Northwest Utilities
Conference Committee, a coalition of hydroelectric project operators. The negotiation produced a Fish Spill Memorandum of
Agreement.2s0 The agreement requires that an annual spill plan
be developed by November 1 each year. This spill plan will govern the following spill and summer migration seasons, and is to be
integrated with the fishery agencies' and tribes' annual smolt
monitoring program. 5' The agreement calls for spills over a tenyear period at four Corps dams' 5 that do not have effective bypass systems. Sufficient spill is to be provided to protect the middle eighty percent of fish runs between April 15 and August 21.
The 1988 agreement extended protection to fish passage outside
of the Water Budget period (April 15 to June 15) for the first
time.
The results of the 1989 spill agreement were encouraging.
Even though the Corps and the utilities refused to sign the agreement, the Fish Passage Managers reported that "all parties car250. See

NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, NOTICE OF FINAL ACTION ON
(1989); FISH SPILL MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note

SPILL AMENDMENTS

224.
251. See 1989 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 224, at 30.
252. Lower Monumental, Ice Harbor, John Day, and The Dalles.
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ried out the Agreement as written, and no deviations were
made.""' The 1990 implementation was just as successful.'"
Securing adequate spills resolved one of two long-standing
shortcomings of the program's mainstem passage provisions.
However, it bears noting that this agreement was not reached as a
result of the Council's leadership. Instead, it was the product of
difficult, protracted negotiations between fishery and power interests that frankly was made possible only by the filing of a lawsuit. s Rather than devising the innovative and imaginative solutions to fishery-power tradeoffs as Congress envisioned,'" the
Council seems content in the role of ratifying deals reached by
others. Resolution of the other long-standing mainstem passage
problem, mainstem flows, appears destined to follow a similar
path.
2. Establishinga Wildlife Program
The development and operation of the Columbia Basin hydroelectric system damaged not only fish but other wildlife as
well. Inundation of riparian habitat, fluctuating water levels, wetlands loss, stream channelization, shoreline riprapping, and clearing transmission line corridors all contributed to the wildlife
losses." 7 Both Congress and the Council recognized the need for
wildlife mitigation long ago.'" However, efforts outside of Mon253. 1989 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 224.

254. Interview with Rob Lothrop, Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n.
(July 16, 1990).
255. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. BPA's proposed expansion
of the Pacific Intertie, which electrically links the Pacific Northwest with California, prompted the suit. Fishery advocates feared that increased power sales to
California would make spills of water for fish less likely. See Jones, Intertie Expansion and Fish Protection: Idaho Objects to BPA's Draft EIS, reprinted in
ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO, Feb. 1987, at 2-9 (issue no. 39, Nat. Resources L.
Inst.); U. S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES CONCERNING EXPANSION OF THE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST-SOUTHWEST INTERTIE 36-49 (1988) (criticizing BPA's methodology for assessing fishery impacts associated with intertie expansion).
256. H.R. REP. No. 976, supra note 6, at 57, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE

& ADMIN.

NEWS 5989.
NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL. BACKGROUND AND TEXT OF
PROPOSED WILDLIFE AMENDMENTS 1 (1989).
CONG.

257. See

258. See Brown, Breathing Life Back Into a Drowned Resource: Mitigating
Wildlife Losses in the Columbia Basin Under the Northwest Power Act, 18
ENVTL. L. 571, 577-78 (1988) (citing legislative history). See also Parity III, supra
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tanas" stalled over disagreements concerning how much wildlife
and habitat was lost, and whether the hydroelectric system was
responsible for mitigating all or a portion of the loss.
In late 1989, the Council finally adopted a process to mitigate
wildlife loss basinwide.'" Despite arguments that the program
should compensate for the entire adverse effects of dams,26' the
amendment established an interim goal of mitigating only thirtyfive percent of lost wildlife habitat over the next ten years.-" The
amendment also called for the Council to audit the individual loss
statements of fishery agencies prior to BPA funding of any mitigation plan.113 It also set several standards that mitigation plans
must satisfy,'" and promised wildlife representation in all matters of planning and operating the hydroelectric system.'" In addition, the Council directed FERC to take into account wildlife
mitigation projects at federal dams when FERC licenses
nonfederal dams, in order to ensure that nonfederal projects are
consistent with such projects and "contribute
fully and propor2
tionately to regional mitigation goals."1 "
I. The 1990 Amendments
In 1990, the Council amended its protected area designations,
adding about five hundred miles of streams to the list and deleting an equivalent amount. e7 The Council also clarified that new
protected area designations do not affect projects for which the
note 51, at 331-34.
259. See 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 1004(d), table 4 (mitigation at Hungry Horse and Libby Dams).
260. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, WILDLIFE MITIGATION RULE
AND RESPONSE TO COMMENTS (1989) (amending § 1000 of the program) [hereinafter
WILDLIFE MITIGATION RULE].

261. See Brown, supra note 258, at 591-96.
262. WILDLIFE MITIGATION RULE, supra note 260, § 1003(b)(1)(C). The initial
proposal would have established a 50% restoration goal. Letter from Dulcy Mahar, Public Involvement Director, Northwest Power Planning Council, to Interested Parties (Nov. 21, 1989) (letter accompanying the mitigation rule).
263. WILDLIFE MITIGATION RULE,supra note 260, § 1003(b)(3), (b)(4)(A)-(B).
264. Id. § 1003(b)(4)(C).
265. Id. § 1003(a)(1).
266. Id. § 1003(e).
267. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, PROTECTED AREAS SUMMARY AND
RESPONSE TO COMMENTS 2 (1990). The Council listed 30 FERC applications in
which FERC sought exemptions from the 1988 protected designations. Id. at 4-15.
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developer had already obtained a preliminary permit or filed a
FERC application.'u The Council also rejected a proposal that
would have applied protected area status to all projects where
there had not been a substantial investment of resources.* In
addition, the Council also set priorities in 1990 to govern BPA's
7
implementation of the program's wildlife mitigation provisions. '
At the close of 1990, the Columbia Basin Program was preparing for a new round of amendments in 1991 which would include a comprehensive basinwide plan to guide restoration efforts. ' But the program's inability to resolve mainstem passage
issues led fishery advocates increasingly to look elsewhere to
achieve the co-equal partnership between fish and hydropower
that Congress promised. In 1990, this search led to a federal court
challenge to a BPA storage agreement that promised fish no significant benefits, and to Endangered Species Act petitions. These
events, described in the following Section, pushed the Council's
program off center stage and into the shadows.
IV.

THE PARITY PROMISE UNRAVELLED: THE PROGRAM'S
FISH FLOW FAILURE

By 1991, the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife program was
in its tenth year. The program had achieved some notable successes. Chief among them was the designation of protected areas
to safeguard anadromous fish habitat from future hydroelectric
development .'7 'The Council also showed itself to be an effective
advocate for obtaining congressional funding for mechanical bypass systems at existing dams.' 7 ' In an era of immense federal
budget deficits, this was no minor achievement. While it is too
early to evaluate the efficacy of the program's subbasin approach
to production,' 7 4 the Council's effort to maintain genetic diversity
while increasing fish runs 7 5 is commendable and farsighted. The
268. Id. at 17-18.
269. Id. at 17.
270. Letter from Northwest Power Planning Council to Interested Parties
(Oct. 24,
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

1990).
See supra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 237-46, 267-69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 228-36 and accompanying text.
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program's integrated, systemwide approach to anadromous fish
restoration is pathbreaking in both scope and ambition.
Unfortunately, the program's successes continue to be overshadowed by the Council's inability to restructure hydroelectric
operations to accommodate the biological needs of anadromous
fish. Between 1982 and 1988 the Council proved to be either unwilling or unable to secure sufficient spills to ensure safe bypass
at dams without adequate mechanical systems. 7
Although the long struggle over spills was finally resolved in
late 1988,277 the Council played only an incidental role in resolving the problem. Instead, the filing of a lawsuit prompted negotiations culminating in an agreement between the fishery agencies,
Indian tribes, and hydroelectric managers. The Council neither
initiated nor facilitated the agreement; it merely ratified the

agreements7 8
The larger issue of providing sufficient river flows to safely
transport migrating juvenile fish to the ocean remains unresolved,
and the Council shows no signs of being able to tackle the problem effectively. In this Section, we examine the roots of the program's inability to respond to the congressional command to improve flows to achieve sound biological objectives. 27 ' First, we
consider the way in which hydropower dominates Columbia Basin
streamflows under current operating arrangements. Next, we describe the streamflows which the fishery agencies and tribes believe are biologically necessary. We then discuss a recent BPA attempt to increase hydropower dominance over streamflows.
Finally, we offer some reasons why the fish flow issue has led to
the unravelling of the parity promise.
A. Columbia Basin Dam Operations
Under the Coordination Agreement

The roots of the fish flow issue lie in the way in which Columbia Basin dam operators manipulate mainstem river flows. Although not authorized primarily for hydroelectric purposes,'" Co276. See supra notes 133-36, 147-56, 194-210 and accompanying text.

277. See supra notes 224, 250-56 and accompanying text.
278. See supra text preceding note 255.
279. See supra note 40, infra note 310 and accompanying text.
280. See Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 22, at 228.
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lumbia Basin dams continue to be operated principally for power
generation, largely on the basis of intergovernmental agreements
and other contractual arrangements." 1 These agreements effectuate the provisions of the Columbia River Treaty, 6' which doubled
the Basin's water storage capacity and effectively harnessed the
spring freshet upon which juvenile fish depend for migration to
the sea."3
The agreement of greatest significance was the Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement of 1964 (Coordination Agreement).2" The Coordination Agreement established detailed operating criteria and power exchange principles, allocated
downstream benefits, and required annual systemwide planning
to optimize hydroelectric production.' The Coordination Agreement and its annual plans seek to maximize power production
from system operations, once project specific nonpower constraints, such as flood control requirements, have been met.
By default, the Coordination Agreement is the primary vehicle for planning the coordinated operation of Columbia Basin
streamflows. While the agreement establishes detailed mechanisms for coordinating power operations, other purposes such as
fisheries, irrigation, and recreation are merely treated as operational "constraints." The Coordination Agreement contains no
provisions to integrate operations for all system purposes, except
to state: "Nothing in this agreement shall require a party to operate a Project in a manner inconsistent with its requirements for
nonpower uses or functions ....," As a result, the operation of
the coordinated system is responsive primarily to hydropower
purposes. In contrast, nonpower operation is dealt with on a project-by-project basis.
281. See Id. at 245-46, 249-56 (discussing Pacific Northwest Coordination
Agreement, Agreement for Coordination Among Power Systems of the Pacific
Northwest (1964)).
282. Columbia River Treaty, Jan. 17, 1961-Sept. 16, 1964, United
States-Canada, 15 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5638. See Johnson, The Canada-UnitedStates
Controversy over the Columbia River, 41 WASH. L. REV. 676 (1966) (analysis of the
background, negotiations, and issues involved in the treaty).
283. See Hydroelectric Heritage,supra note 15, at 215-19.
284. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., AGREEMENT FOR COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS AMONG POWER SYSTEMS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (1964) [hereinafter CoORDINATION AGREEMENT].

285. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
286. COORDINATION AGREEMENT, supra note 284,

§ 15.
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The upshot is that under the coordinated system plan, water
is stored in the spring and summer for release in the fall and winter, when power sales are most lucrative. Unfortunately, anadromous fish need high river flows in the spring and summer for
downstream migration.
The Coordination Agreement includes a provision which appears to permit operations more consistent with the biological
needs of migrating fish.2 7 However, the signatories to the agreement, including BPA, the Corps, and generating utilities, have
consistently rejected the biologically-based flows requested by
federal and state fishery agencies and Indian tribes. They point to
the Council's Water Budget as the full extent of their nonpower
obligations.'" Yet the power managers recently rejected a fishery
agency request to incorporate "base power flows," a critical assumption of the Water Budget, into Coordination Agreement
planning.26 ' Equally troubling is the fact that these power managers apparently believe the program implicitly sanctions their actions which damage fish and fish habitat outside of the, twomonth Water Budget period.'".
No Coordination Agreement annual plan has ever satisfied
the National Environmental Policy Act's (NEPA) requirement of
public and interagency analysis in an environmental impact stateUntil Coordination Agreement planning satisfies
ment."
NEPA, 2' there is no assurance that spring and summer flows in
287. The agreement provides that
[n]othing... shall require a party to operate a Project in a manner inconsistent with its requirements for nonpower uses or functions [nor] suffer
any penalty ... because of any Project operation undertaken in good faith
for the purpose of preserving priority to such nonpower uses or
functions ....

Id.
288. For example, BPA claimed that "[eiquitable treatment is guaranteed by
the fact that BPA is taking the Council's Program into account." See BONNEVILLE
POWER ADMIN., NON-TREATY STORAGE AGREEMENT, ISSUE SUMMARY AND RESPONSE

To COMMENTS 7 (1989) [hereinafter NON-TREATY STORAGE AGREEMENT].

289. Lothrop Interview, supra note 254. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
291. The argument for an EIS on annual system plans was made in Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 22, at 262-68.
292. BPA, the Corps, and the Bureau of Reclamation are conducting a systemwide review to develop a new multiple use plan that will, among other things,
produce a revised Coordination Agreement. See Collette, A Gathering of Authori-
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the Columbia will be in the public interest. Furthermore, the
Northwest Power Act requires all actions of federal water managers to give "equitable treatment" to fish and wildlife, quite apart
from any measures called for by the Council's program." 83 The
exact nature of this obligation is not yet certain, but it is clear
this provision is intended to put fish and power "on an equal
footing", and that it imposes on federal water managers substantive duties that are enforceable by the courts.19' In a subsequent
statute Congress used a phrase similar to "equitable treatment"
to imply imposition of a nondegradation-like standard." 5 In addition to the EIS required by NEPA and the equitable treatment
obligation imposed by the Northwest Power Act, there has never
been an explanation of how and why annual power system planning satisfies Indian treaty rights.'"
ties: A Broad Review of the Columbia River System May Redefine the Roles of
Federal Entities, NORTHWzST ENERGY NEWS, July/Aug. 1990, at 8 (Northwest
Power Planning Council). While BPA apparently intends to subject the new plan
to NEPA analysis, NEPA compliance must take place annually because critical
decisions about system operations are made in the annual system plans. Moreover,
future NEPA compliance with respect to the new plan is no cure for current
NEPA violations.
293. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(i) (1988).
294. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 746 F.2d 466, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom,
Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 471
U.S. 1116 (1985). See also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 801 F.2d 1505, 1515 (9th Cir. 1986). For discussions of Confederated
Tribes, see Blumm, A Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC: Reforming the Federal Role in
Hydropower Licensing, 10 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 34-46 (1986); Bodi & Erdheim,
Swimming Upstream: FERC's Failure to Protect Anadromous Fish, 13 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 7, 19-20, 34, 39-40 (1986).
295. 16 U.S.C. § 803(j), which was added by the Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243, requires FERC to "adequately and equitably protect, mitigate damage to, and enhance fish and wildlife
[habitat]." The "equitable" language "seeks to ensure that nonpower values are,
to the greatest extent possible, as healthy and as abundant after licensing and
development as before". H.R. REP. No. 507, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Nzws 2496, 2517-18. See generally Grimm, Fishery Protection and FERC Hydropower Relicensing Under ECPA: Maintaining a
Deadly Status Quo, 20 ENvTL. L. 929 (1990).
296. 16 U.S.C. § 839g(e). See Parity II, supra note 46, at 139-46. See also
Blumm, Native FishingRights in North America and New Zealand: A Comparative Analysis of Profits A Prendre and Habitat Servitudes, 8 Wisc. Intl. L.J. 1, 811 (1989)(discussing the Indian treaty fishing right to habitat protection).
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B.

The Fishery Coalition'sFlow Proposal

Recognizing the Columbia Basin Program's failure to deliver
sufficient mainstem flows, the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Authority, a coalition of the region's fishery agencies and Indian
tribes, proposed a comprehensive flow regime in March 1990. The
coalition also recommended institutional changes necessary to implement these biologically-based flows. The changes included full
representation in Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement
planning, and treatment of the flows as "hard constraints" on system operations that must be met under all conditions.'" The recommended flows are quite similar to its original flow proposal in
1981.'" The 1990 recommendations reiterated the 1981 request
for a minimum flow on the lower Columbia and asked for summer
flows through August of each year.2"
In February 1991, the fishery coalition submitted a detailed

297. COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE AUTHORITY, PROPOSED MAINSTEM
FLOWS FOR COLUMBIA BASIN ANADROMOUS FISH 3 (1990) [hereinafter Proposed
Mainstem Flows].
298. Id. at 9; cf. I Coalition Recommendations, supra note 7, at 179-206. The
1981 proposal was premised on a sliding scale that called for higher flows in good
water years and lower flows in poor water years. Id. The 1991 recommendations

were for fixed flows and also included flows for resident fish affected by the operation of Hungry Horse, Libby, Grand Coulee, Chief Joseph, Dworshak, and

Brownlee Dams. Proposed Mainstem Flows, supra note 297, at 10-12.
299. Id. at 9. The complete recommendations are set forth below in kcfs, with

the first figure signifying minimum instantaneous flow and the second signifying
daily average flows:
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biological justification for its recommended flows."* Fishery advocates will certainly seek approval of those flow levels in forthcoming proceedings under both the Northwest Power Act and the
ESA. In fact, the coalition's recommended flows have already
been raised in a suit challenging an attempt by BPA to increase
the dominance of hydropower in system operations, as explained
in the following Section.
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C. Increasing Hydropower Dominance
Through Non-treaty Storage
While the fishery coalition was proposing biologically-based
mainstem fish flows, BPA was attempting to increase its control
over river flows for power purposes through a Non-Treaty Storage
Agreement with British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority
(BC Hydro).ssl Signed only three months after the coalition's proposal, the BPA-BC Hydro agreement is a result of BC Hydro's
construction of about five maf of storage in excess of the 15.5 maf
called for by the Columbia River Treaty, most of which lies behind Mica Dam. Because Northwest power forecasts indicate that
the electric surpluses of the 1980s will not continue in the
1990s,s' access to this additional storage would enable BPA to
meet anticipated growth in electric demand while reducing pressure to acquire new generating resources.
Fishery advocates fear that the Non-Treaty Storage Agreement will exacerbate inadequate spring' and summer flows because the agreement would permit BPA to store water in these
months for power sales later in the year. BPA neither considered
using a portion of the new storage to improve fish flows, nor evaluated the potential effects of the agreement on the coalition's recommended flows.

08

Consequently, several fishing and environ-

301. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., NoN-TRATY STORAGE AGREEMENT WITH BC

HYDRO (1990) (Administrator's Decision Record) [hereinafter NON-TREATY STORAGE AGREEMENT]. The 1990 Non-Treaty Storage Agreement actually replaced a
preexisting agreement that BPA and BC Hydro signed in 1984, giving BPA access
to 2 maf, which was scheduled to expire in 1993. The 1990 agreement more than
doubled the storage available to BPA, to 4.5 maf, and extended the term by a
decade, until 2003. See id. at 1.
302. In the early 1980s, the Council anticipated "an expensive [power] surplus of uncertain duration." 1986 POWER PLAN, supra note 17, at 1-5. Now, however, the Council projects that current energy production will be insufficient by
the end of the decade. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, DRAFt 1991 NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AND ELECTRIC POWER PLAN 5 (1990) (hereinafter DRAft 1991
POWER PLAN].
303. NON-TREATY STORAGE AGREEMENT, supra

note 301, at 14-15, BPA did
negotiate an agreement with the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority that
promised (1) the Non-Treaty Storage Agreement would produce no greater adverse effects on fish and wildlife than would occur in the absence of a new agreement, (2) one million dollars a year to establish a program to rent water to improve flows in the Snake during 1992 and 1993, and (3) financing for a
representative of the fishery agencies and tribes to be housed in BPA's power sup-
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mental groups filed suit, charging that the environmental
documentation on the agreement violated NEPA. They also alleged Northwest Power Act violations for failure to follow procedures required for major power acquisitions and failure to give
"equitable treatment" to fish and wildlife by not allocating flows
3
to fish. 04
The nontreaty storage controversy reflects badly on the
Council's role as a problem-solver. As evidence of the imperiled
nature of many upriver fish runs mounted, the Council had an
opportunity to secure a share of the benefits of Canadian storage
for the fish. But the Council claimed that it had no role in the
matter because BPA's action was merely an "exchange" of power,
not an "acquisition" of new power.305 Through such interpretations, the interstate agency Congress created to develop innovative measures to balance hydropower-fish tradeoffs has relegated
itself to a minor, almost irrelevant role in resolving the largest
ply division with "regular access to top level decisionmakers." Id. at 15-16. The
opponents of the Non-Treaty Storage Agreement, infra note 304 and accompanying text, believe that the "no greater adverse effects" provision is unenforceable
because of a lack of reliable information on the effects of project operations and
doubt the efficacy of the other promises.
304. Petition for Review Under the Northwest Power Act and Other Applicable Law, Northwest Envtl. Defense Center v. Jura, (No. 90-70548) (9th Cir. filed
Oct. 5, 1990).
305. The Council concluded that the Non-Treaty Storage agreement was an
interregional exchange, not a resource acquisition, because it merely enabled the
conversion of nonfirm power to firm power. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUN-

CIL, REVIEW

OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER

TREATY

AND THE COLUMBIA STORAGE POWER

5-7 (1989). Under the Northwest Power Act, "major resource acquisitions" (over 50 megawatts and acquired for more than five years) are subject to a
public review process, including public hearings, which culminates in a determination by BPA that the acquisition is consistent with the Council's power plan. The
Council may make its own consistency determination. If it disagrees with BPA,
the resources may be acquired only with specific congressional authorization. 16
U.S.C. § 839d(c)(2)-(4) (1988). The Council might have had difficulty concluding
that the Non-Treaty Storage Agreement is consistent with its power plan because
the plan requires new acquisitions to include sufficient flows for juvenile migration. Northwest Power Planning Council, 1986 Northwest Conservationand Electric Power Plan, App. II-B-1.
The Council's willingness to remove itself from any meaningful role in the
non-treaty storage issue ought to be compared to its inability to resolve the spill
issue until a lawsuit prompted a settlement agreement that did not involve the
Council. See supra notes 112, 255-56 and accompanying text. The Council played
a similarly passive role concerning the installation of mechanical bypass facilities
on FERC-licensed dams on the mid-Columbia. See Bodi, supra note 198.
EXCHANGE
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issue confronting the region today. Its abdication of leadership
leaves the fish flow issue to forums like the court in the nontreaty storage suit and the ESA proceeding, discussed in Section
V below.
D. The Failure of Parity Promise:
The Council and the Fish Flow Issue
Insufficient spring and summer fish flows mean the mainstem
Columbia and Snake Rivers will not provide sufficient juvenile
migrant survival to rebuild depleted upriver runs. As a result, the
considerable investments the Columbia Basin Program has made
to increase production and preserve habitat may be wasted.
There are many reasons why the program has been unable to secure adequate flows.
First, flows involve power tradeoffs. While fish flows do not
reduce the system's capacity for generating hydropower, they
change the timing of power generation, from the fall and winter
to the spring and summer. There is currently no market in the
Northwest for additional power produced in the spring and summer. Thus if the existing market for power is the limit of the
power system's flexibility, power operators will always resist fish
flows for economic reasons.
Second, power managers lack any real incentive to consider
the flow issue seriously. Although the fishery agencies and the
tribes have requested flows since 1979, they have been unable to
convince either the Council or federal water managers that adequate flows are biologically necessarys"e In 1982, the Council diffused some of the issue's urgency by adopting the Water Budget.
But the Water Budget was poorly conceived and provided too little water over too short a period. 0 7 Moreover, when faced with
306. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (requested flows), supra note
56 (federal water managers). In comments on a draft of this article, Brian Brown
noted that "the issue is not whether water managers have been convinced of the

biology, but whether there is adequate incentive for them to accept less-than-maximum revenues ....
Biological necessity is not an incentive for a power manager
who views fish as someone else's responsibility." Letter from Brian Brown, National Marine Fisheries Serv., to Michael Blumm (April 4, 1991).
307. See supra note 88-92 and accompanying text. For example, the budget
covered too narrow a period during the spring migrant season. It was to rely on
"firm power" flows that turned out not to be firm. The budget encouraged system
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opposition, the Council showed little or no interest in confronting
controversy and seeing that its program was implemented by system operators.3 "
Ambiguities in the text of the Northwest Power Act provide
a third reason for the program's failure to provide adequate fish
flows. The Act directs federal water managers merely to take the
program "into account . .. to the fullest extent practicable. ''ss
This phrase, coupled with strong opposition from the utilities and
federal water managers, seems to have weakened the Council's resolve to act as a fishery advocate. The Council has proved unwilling to enforce its program in court, despite congressional directives to improve fish flows and defer to the biological expertise of
the fishery agencies and Indian tribes.310 Curiously, the Council
apparently never interpreted these statutory provisions to be related to each other.
Fourth, institutional dynamics may be the primary source of
the program's failure to secure ample fish flows. In retrospect,
Congress was unwise to vest authority for making hydropowerfish tradeoffs in a new institution composed of members with no
biological expertise and a high turnover rate. The Council has always devoted greater attention to its power planning responsibility than to its fish and wildlife restoration mandates 1 despite, or
perhaps because of, the difficult biological, technical, economic,
and legal issues involved. By the time Council members begin to
appreciate the magnitude of their fish and wildlife responsibility,
operators to minimize its cost by eliminating flows outside the budget period. Also
it contained far less water than the fishery coalition recommended, especially on
the Snake. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text
308. On budget implementation problems, see supra notes 100-106, 181-84
and accompanying text.
309. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii) (1988).
310. The Act requires fish flows of "sufficient quality and quantity ...
to

improve production, migration, and survival... as necessary to meet sound biological objectives". Id. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(ii). On the deference owed the fishery agencies and tribes, see supra note 49.
311. For the years 1990-92, budgets for fish and wildlife are estimated at
$1,622,000, $1,171,000, and $1,205,000, respectively, while budgets for power planning were $2,342,000, $1,602,000, and $1,601,000, respectively. NORTHWEST POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL, FISCAL YEAR 1992 BUDGET AND FISCAL YEAR 1991 REVISIONS 3,
13-14 (1990). Three-year totals were less than $4,000,000 for fish and wildlife, but
over $5,500,000 for power planning.
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their term is over,812 and the learning curve must begin anew.
Many members simply have no fish and wildlife experience or interest. Consequently, they are reluctant to assume a role actively
overseeing other, more long-standing institutions. This reticence
permits agencies like BPA and the Corps either to continue their
old ways of doing business or to make small, incremental
changes-while claiming that meaningful change would not be
economical.
It now seems that Congress would have been wiser to vest
greater decision-making authority in the entities that know the
fishery resource the best: the region's fishery agencies and Indian
tribes. Ironically, the Northwest Power Act prompted the agencies and the tribes to set aside old differences and form an effective coalition: the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority.
The best way to overcome the institutional inertia surrounding the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program would be to
allocate more decision-making authority to the fishery agencies
and the tribes, and to set a deadline for establishing biologically
justified fish flows. We think that the Act intended those results,
but the Council has failed to pursue them. Now, that institutional
inertia is likely to be broken by the Endangered Species Act,
which vests decision-making authority in federal fishery agencies
and sets deadlines for taking action.
V. THE PROSPECT OF ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT LISTING
Thirteen years ago, in 1978, NMFS and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service initiated a status review to determine whether
upriver Columbia Basin salmon runs qualified for listing as
threatened or endangered species under the Endangered Species
Act (ESA).3 1 3 However, passage of the Northwest Power Act en-

couraged the agencies to suspend their review.314 Instead, they de312. The Act permits the participating states to set the term for their members of the Council. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(3). Oregon, Washington, and Idaho Council members serve three year terms. OR. REV. STAT. § 469.805 (1989); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 43.52A.040(1) (1990); IDAHO CODE § 61-1203(1) (1976 & Supp. 1990).

Montana members serve four year terms. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-4-402(1)
(1989).
313. 43 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (1978). For a thorough discussion of the issues involved in the listing process, see Bodi, supra note 4.
314. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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voted attention to participating in the 1980 Act's call for a fish
and wildlife program. A decade of attempting to design and implement that program has failed to reverse the serious decline of
wild stocks throughout the region, prompting several petitions to
list Columbia Basin anadromous fish stocks under the ESA.315
On March 30, 1990, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe submitted
a petition calling for the listing of Snake River sockeye. Two
months later, a coalition of environmental groups led by Oregon
Trout filed petitions seeking listing of the spring, summer and fall
runs of Snake River chinook and lower Columbia River coho.316
These petitions, along with the recent designation of the winter
run of Sacramento River chinook as a threatened species,il7 have
ushered in a new era of anadromous fish law.
A.

The Sacramento River Listing

In 1985, the American Fisheries Society, a seven thousand
member scientific association, petitioned NMFS for threatened
status for the winter run of Sacramento chinook. NMFS rejected
that petition in early 1987. 88 However, drought conditions in
1987-88 forced the agency to reconsider its decision. In late 1988,
NMFS again determined that listing was not appropriate because
other protection measures were satisfactorily mitigating the
315. Citizen petitions, authorized by 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A), must be supported by "substantial information" in order for the agencies to initiate a status
review. 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b) (1990). For some of the biological evidence that
might support a listing, see OREGON TROUT, INC, AREAS WHERE ANADROMOUS FISH
HAVE GONE EXTINCT IN OREGON (1989) (listing 57 areas of wild steelhead extinctions, 29 of wild coho, 15 of wild sockeye, and classifying 51 other stocks as "endangered" (run size of less than 100 fish), "threatened" (100 to 400 fish), and
"special concern" (400 to 1,000 fish)).
316. Also petitioning were the Northwest Environmental Defense Center, the
Oregon and Idaho chapters of the American Fisheries Society, American Rivers,
and the Oregon Natural Resources Council. 55 Fed. Reg. 37,342 (1990). See supra
note 11.
317. See infra notes 321-22, 324-25 and accompanying text. A "threatened
species" is one that is "likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future .... " 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20). An "endangered species" is one that "is in
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range ....
Id. §
1532(6). A "species" includes subspecies and distinct population segments that
interbreed. Id. § 1532(16).
318. 52 Fed. Reg. 6041 (1987).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985156

1991)

UNRAVELING OF THE PROMISE

drought's effects2 11 As late as 1969, there were some 118,000
spawners in the run. But for two decades, the size of the run declined sharply-chiefly due to the operation of the Bureau of Reclamation's Central Valley Project. Nevertheless, in the late 1980s
the Sacramento run seemed to have stabilized at about 2000
spawners.3"0 However, when the 1989 run plummeted another
seventy-five percent to a mere 550 spawners, NMFS published an
emergency rule listing the winter run as a threatened species.2 '
In April 1990, NMFS extended the emergency listing, and also
designated about sixty miles of the Sacramento River between
32 2
Red Bluff and Keswick Dams as critical habitat.
Threatened species designation invokes the ESA's conservation measures which include (1) consultation procedures with
other federal agencies to implement conservation programs, (2)
limitations on takings, and (3) promulgation of recovery plans. In
the case of the Sacramento winter chinook, NMFS consulted with
the Bureau of Reclamation with respect to operation of Red Bluff
Dam; with the Corps of Engineers regarding gravel mining and
flood control operations; and with the Pacific Fishery Management Council concerning the effects of sport and commercial fishing. The thrust of the emergency rule was to require the Bureau
of Reclamation to change its operations at the Red Bluff Dam to
maintain suitable water temperatures in the critical habitat during the spawning season. The operational changes will reduce
power generation, but NMFS tailored the rule to have no effect
on irrigation diversions or fishing practices authorized by the
22
state or the Pacific Fishery Management Council.3
In November
1990, the United States Fish and Wildlife -Service and NMFS
adopted final. rules listing the Sacramento winter-run chinook as
threatened.32 ' NMFS plans to designate critical habitat in a sepa319. NMFS referred to a state-initiated 10-part restoration plan. 53 Fed. Reg.
49723 (1988). The petitioners challenged this decision in court, contending that

NMFS could not refuse to list a species which biologically met the statutory definition of "threatened" or "endangered" (supra note 317). The case became moot
when NMFS listed the species as threatened. See supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text.
320. 53 Fed. Reg. 49,722 (1988). See Pacific Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's
Ass'ns, 18 PCFFA FRIDAY 10 (1990).
321. 54 Fed. Reg. 32,085 (1989) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1990)).
322. 55 Fed. Reg. 12,191 (1990); 55 Fed. Reg. 12,831 (1990).
323. 55 Fed. Reg. 12,192-93.
324. 55 Fed. Reg. 49,623; 55 Fed. Reg. 46,515.
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rate rule.8 25
B.

The Status of Columbia Basin Stocks

In June of 1990, NMFS and the Oregon Department of Fish
and Wildlife submitted a status report to Senator Mark Hatfield
on the Columbia Basin runs named in the ESA petitions
The
report cautioned that it did not necessarily represent the best scientific information available, as required by the ESA. Nevertheless, the report did indicate the relative health of the runs under
consideration for ESA protection.
The numbers are, if anything, more alarming than those
which convinced NMFS to list the Sacramento winter chinook. In
the last twenty years, Snake River spring chinook have declined
from about 3000 spawners in the Grande Ronde subbasin to 338
in 1989, and from about 1500 spawners in the Imnaha subbasin to
412 in 1989.27 Spring chinook in the Salmon and Clearwater subbasins show similar declines. The 1989 annual spring chinook
redd count in the Salmon River was only six percent of the 1961
count, and natural escapement was near the lowest ever observed.328 In 1989, summer chinook redds in the Salmon subbasin
numbered 501, down from an annual average of 20,000 between
1962 and 1970.29 Only around 4200 adult summer chinook passed
Lower Granite Dam in 1989, compared to a peak of nearly 31,000
twenty years earlier. 8 " Fall chinook are in even worse shape.
Adult escapement of fall chinook over Lower Granite was below
1000 annually from 1983-89, with an increasing number of straying hatchery fish after 1988.81
Columbia Basin sockeye once had run sizes of up to three
325. 55 Fed. Reg. 46,522.
326. See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV. & OREGON DEP'T OF FISH AND
WILDLIFE, PAST AND PRESENT ABUNDANCE OF SNAKE RIVER SOCKEYE, SNAKE RIVER
CHINOOK, AND LOWER COLUMBIA RIVER COHO SALMON (1990) [hereinafter PAST AND
PRESENT ABUNDANCE REPORT]. See also OREGON DEP'T OF FISH & WILDLIFE AND
WASHINGTON DEP'T OF FISHERIES, COLUMBIA RIVER FISH RUNS AND FISHERIES, 196088 (1989) [hereinafter COLUMBIA FISH RUNS AND FISHERIES].
327. COLUMBIA FISH RUNS AND FISHERIES, supra note 326, at 7.

328. Id. at 11.

329. Id. at 14.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 20-21.
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million fish, but of the eight lake-riverine systems that once supported the bulk of the runs, only three remain: the Okanagon and
Wenatchee River systems in Washington, and the Salmon in
Idaho. Idaho-bound sockeye are now virtually extinct. Annual
sockeye counts at Ice Harbor,Dam have dropped from 1276 in
1964 to 4 in 1989. In the years 1981 to 1984, sockeye spawners in
Redfish Lake numbered only 26, 50, 0, and 22, respectively."'
Wild runs of coho salmon above Bonneville Dam have essentially disappeared. The few remaining wild stocks spawn in the
lower basin, below Bonneville Dam. Thus, to the extent these
runs are imperiled, their problems cannot be attributed to the hydroelectric system, but rather to harvest management and hatchery operation. Between 1969 and 1977 coho populations collapsed,
declining thirty-two percent per year, and have remained at dangerously low levels since then. Rearing densities in lower Columbia tributaries declined from nineteen juveniles per pool in 1972
to eight per pool in 1985,
which is only about ten percent of opti3
mum carrying capacity.

31

These figures are chilling, but they may represent only the
tip of the iceberg. The American Fisheries Society's Endangered
Species Committee considers 101 naturally spawning stocks of
anadromous fish between central California and the Canadian
border to be facing a high risk of extinction, fifty-four more at
moderate risk, and fifty-eight of special concern.3 3" Even BPA
concedes that thirteen runs in the Columbia Basin alone are in
critical condition.' " Oregon Trout estimates that wild stocks in
332. Id. at 23.

333. Id.
334. Nehlsen, Williams, & Lichatowich, Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads:
Stocks at Risk from California, Oregon, Idaho, and Washington, 16 FISHERIES 4
(issue no. 2, 1991).
335. See Koberstein, supra note 10. The American Fisheries Society's list of
Columbia Basin stocks that are depressed and declining includes (1).Sandy River
fall chinook, (2) Hood River fall chinook, (3) Hood River spring chinook, (4) Tucannon River spring chinook, (5) Asotin Creek spring chinook, (6) Salmon River
(Idaho) spring chinook (Middle Fork), (7) Salmon River (Idaho) summer chinook
(Middle Fork and upper river), (8) Lower Columbia River coho (below the Willamette River), (9) Sandy River coho, (10) Yakima River coho (if present), (11)
Snake River coho (believed extinct), (12) Snake River sockeye (functionally extinct), and (13) Wind River winter steelhead. See Pacific Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns, 18 PCFFA FRIDAY 9 (1990).
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the basin have dropped to two percent of their historic levels. 8"
C.

The ESA Listing Process

Under the ESA's listing procedures,""7 NMFS (or the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service in the case of nonmarine species) generally has ninety days after receiving a listing petition to make a
preliminary determination whether the petition presents substantial scientific or commercial information indicating that listing
may be warranted. 8 " If it finds in the affirmative, NMFS then
has twelve months from the filing of the petition to perform a
status review and propose to list the species, if warranted. Listing
decisions must be made solely on the basis of best available scientific knowledge; economic costs are irrelevant.8 3 9 NMFS must
make a final determination within a year of the proposal."0 The
public may comment throughout this process." 1 The process may
be expedited through the use of emergency listings if there is "a
' 34 2
significant risk to the well-being of any species,
which was the
case with the Sacramento winter chinook.3 48
The NMFS status review on the Columbia Basin stocks concentrated on two specific questions. The first was whether a particular fish run qualifies as a "species" under the ESA. The sec336. OREGON TROUT, INC.. THE LISTING POST 1 (May 30, 1990).
337. See Bodi, supra note 4, at 350-67, D. ROHL, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT: A GUIDE To ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 37-58 (1989).

338. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (1988).
339. Id. § 1533(b)(1)(a), (b)(3)(B). In 1982, Congress amended the ESA to
clarify that listing decisions are to be based "solely" on the best scientific and
commercial data available. The legislative history emphasized that economic considerations should play no role in listing decisions.
The addition of the word "solely" is intended to remove from the process of
the listing or delisting of species any factor not related to the biological
status of the species. The Committee strongly believes that economic considerations have no relevance to determinations regarding the status of species .... Applying economic criteria ... to any phase of the species listing
process .. .is specifically rejected by the inclusion of the word "solely" in
this legislation.
H.R. REP. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2820.
340. 16 U.S.C. § .533(b)(6).
341. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(B)-(E).
342. Emergency listings are effective only for 240 days. Id. § 1533(b)(7).
343. See supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985156

1991]

UNRAVELING OF THE PROMISE

ond question concerned the biological threshold for declaring a
species threatened (that is, "likely to become endangered") or endangered.8 " NMFS convened an Interagency Coordinating Committee and a Technical Advisory Committee to help it acquire appropriate biological information.
The ESA requires the designation of critical habitat concurrently with listing a species "to the maximum extent prudent and
determinable." ' Congress intended the "prudent and determinable" exception to be narrowly construed. Nonetheless failure to
designate critical habitat during the listing process is the norm. 46
Critical habitat is that which is "essential" to the conservation of
listed species,8 47 or that which the species needs to make a successful recovery.38 In contrast to the listing decision, economic
s4
factors may influence the designation of critical habitat3
D. Protectionsfor Listed Species
Listed species benefit both from prohibitions against harmful
activities as well as from affirmative duties imposed to improve
the biological status of the species. The most important prohibitions against federal agencies are contained in section 7 of the
Act. Section 9 contains more broad-ranging prohibitions against
taking individuals of an endangered species. The chief affirmative
duty is the promulgation of recovery plans which are required by
section 4(f), although section 7 also contains an important,
344. See PAST AND PRESENT ABUNDANCE REPORT, supra note 326, at 2. In proposing to list the Snake River sockeye as endangered, NMFS decided that "[a]
salmon stock will be considered a distinct population, and hence a species under
the ESA, if it represents an evolutionarily significant unit (ESU) of the biological

species." To be an ESU a stock must satisfy two criteria: (1) be reproductively
isolated from other populations of the same species; and (2) represent an inportant component in the evolutionary legacy of the biological species. 56 Fed. Reg.
14,055, 14,056 (1991). NMFS concluded that the Snake River sockeye satisfied the
first criterion by finding "substantial genetic differences" between the sockeye and
kokanee (landlocked salmon) that also inhabit Idaho's Redfish Lake. The second
criterion was met because the Redfish Lake sockeye were the world's southernmost sockeye population and traveled a greater distance from the sea and to a
higher elevation than any other sockeye run. Id. at 14,057.
345. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (1988).
346. See D. ROHLF, supra note 337, at 50-52.
347. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i).
348. See D.ROHLF, supra note 337, at 52-53, 153.
349. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2); see D. ROHLF, supra note 337, at 56-58.
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though ill-defined, affirmative conservation obligation.
1. Section 7 Duties
Section 7 prohibits federal agencies and their licensees and
their permittees from taking any action likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of a listed species or from modifying its critical habitat.350 The Act requires federal agencies to ascertain
whether their actions might affect listed species.351 If so, and the
federal action involves "major construction activities," the federal
agency must prepare a "biological assessment" evaluating the
likely biological effects. 353 If the biological assessment concludes
that the action is likely to have an adverse effect, the agency must
formally consult with the federal fish and wildlife agencies, culminating in a "biological opinion" prepared by the latter. 6s If the
biological opinion concludes that the action would jeopardize the
species or adversely affect its critical habitat, the action may not
proceed without violating the ESA, although the fish and wildlife
agencies can usually suggest an alternative that avoids jeopardy
or adverse habitat modification. 3s The fish and wildlife agencies
may also require mitigation measures for actions that do not violate section 7.11u
These provisions effectively give federal fish and wildlife
agencies (NMFS in the case of the salmon petitions) decisionmaking authority over any federal actions adversely affecting a
listed species or its habitat. Unlike the Northwest Power Act,
under which decisions affecting the viability of Columbia Basin
350. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
351. Id. § 1536(c)(1). See 50 C.F.R. § 402.12 (1990).
352. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1); 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. The ESA regulations define
"major construction activity" as "a construction project (or other undertaking
having similar physical impacts) which is a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment as referred to in the National Environmental Policy Act .. " Id. For criticism of this regulatory innovation, see D.
ROHLF, supra note 337, at 107-10.
353. Id. § 1536(a)-(b). See generally Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763
(9th Cir. 1985) (outlining the § 7 process). Requiring an adverse effect as a prerequisite to formal consultation is another regulatory innovation-dating to 1986. See
D. ROHLF, supra note 337, at 114-16 (criticizing the changed regulations for allowing federal agencies to make decisions based on incomplete biological
information).
354. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (b)(3)(A).
355. Id. § 1536(b)(4)(ii)-(iii).
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fish runs frequently are left in the hands of federal power managers," the ESA allocates decision-making authority to agencies

with fish and wildlife expertise.
2. Section 9 Prohibitions
While section 7 applies only to federal activities, section 9
prohibits "all persons" from "taking" fish and wildlife species
listed as endangered."s 7 "Taking" is broadly defined to include
"harass, harm, pursue, hunt" and so forth.3' An endangered species is "harmed" if its habitat is adversely modified, even if the
modification takes place on nonfederal land without any federal
permits. 0"
The ESA does not completely forbid the taking of threatened
species, but the fish and wildlife agencies are required to issue
regulations to conserve threatened species.'s In the case of the
Sacramento winter chinook, the emergency regulations included
the section 9 prohibition against takings."' One court has ruled
that regulations protecting threatened species may authorize takings only in extraordinary circumstances, where population pres-

sures on the ecosystem cannot otherwise be relieved. 8 "

Limited exceptions to the ban on takings are available, in356. See supra notes 56, 182, 284-96, 303 and accompanying text.
357. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C) (1988). "Persons" include corporations,
states and localities, as well as federal agencies. Id. § 1532(13).
358. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). Takings of endangered plants are subject to different restrictions. See D. ROLF, supra note 337, at 71-72.
359. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Nat. Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985
(D. Haw. 1979), (habitat modification is a taking) affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
1981) . See also Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Nat. Resources, 649 F. Supp.
1070 (D. Haw. 1986), (habitat modification is a taking, despite no evidence of
death or injury to individual birds, because it would prevent the population as a
whole from recovering) aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). See generally D.
ROHLF, supra note 337, at 59-71 (discussing judicial interpretations of § 9).
360. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
361. 55 Fed. Reg. at 12,193 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 227.21(a)). But see
the exceptions mentioned infra notes 363-67 and accompanying text.
362. See D. ROHLF, supra note 337, at 74-77 (discussing Sierra Club v. Clark,
557 F. Supp. 783 (D. Minn. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 755 F.2d 608
(8th Cir. 1985)). Rohlf concludes that threatened species regulations which allow a
taking "are valid only to the extent that they promote recovery of specific
threatened species." Id.
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cluding threats to human life and incidental takings."" Incidental
takings resulting from federal activities may be authorized
through the section 7 consultation process. 8 " This usually involves including an "incidental take" statement in the biological
opinion"O and must ensure that the proposed activity will not
jeopardize the species' continued existence or adversely modify its
critical habitat.3" For nonfederal actions, "incidental take" permits are available, although the criteria are quite stringent, including preparation of habitat conservation plans designed to ensure that any taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of
species survival and recovery. s6"
The ESA's citizen suit provision permits enforcement by citizens as well as the government.8 " Section 11 of the ESA authorizes citizens to either force the government to take action or restrain violators from acting contrary to the statute's prohibition.
Before proceeding under section 11, a plaintiff must give sixty
days notice to the government and the alleged violator.8 06
3. Section 4(f) Recovery Plans
Section 4(f) of the ESA requires the development and implementation of recovery plans for all listed species. 7 0 However,
fewer than half of listed species currently have functioning recovery plans. "Recovery" means that the species no longer needs the
ESA's protections.871 Recovery plans include discussion of the
listed species' current and past biology, the reasons for its listing,
a target population, and actions or conditions necessary for recovery.8"" Since 1988, the public has had the opportunity to review
363. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.21(c)(2), 17.31(a) (1990) (threats to human life); 16
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1988) (incidental takings).
364. See supra notes 351-56 and accompanying text.

365. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,925, 19,953 (1986).
366. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
367. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B). For an evaluation of the incidental taking provisions,

see D. ROHLF, supra note 337, at 78-86; see also Comment, Habitat Conservation
Plans Under the Endangered Species Act, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 243 (1987).
368. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
369. Id. § 1540(g)(2)(A)(i).
370. Id. § 1533(f. A recovery plan is not required if the agency finds that one
would not promote the conservation of the species. Id.
371. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1990).
372. See generally D. ROHLF, supra note 337, at 87-88.
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and comment on recovery plans.8 78 Plans must contain (1) "site
specific management actions," (2) "objective measurable criteria"
with which to measure progress toward recovery, and (3) esti87
mated time and resources needed to implement the plan goals. '
However, it is unclear whether recovery plans promulgated by the
fish and wildlife agencies bind other federal agencies. 71 Action
agencies must submit biennial 76reports to Congress on implemen8
tation of their recovery plans.

4.

"God Committee" Exemptions

8
In 1978, in response to the well-known snail darter case, "7
Congress created a seven-member, cabinet-level committee to authorize exemptions to the section 7 duties imposed on federal

agencies. 378The so-called "God Committee" may authorize ex-

emptions if it determines, after holding a public hearing, that (1)
no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the proposed action exist; (2) the proposal's benefits clearly outweigh the preservation of

the species in question; and (3) the proposal is of regional or national significance. 70 A biological assessment is a prerequisite to
an exemption, as is a finding that there has been no irretrievable
commitment of resources prior to granting the exemption.Mo This
373. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(4) (1988).
374. Id. § 1533(f)(1)(B).
375. See D. ROHLF, supra note 337, at 91; Pyramid Lake Pauite Tribe v.
Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1418 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[A] non-Interior agency is given discretion to decide whether to implement conservation recommendations put forth
by the [U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service]"(construing 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(j)).
376. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(3).
377. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (affirming an injunction against construction of the Tellico Dam).
378. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3) (1988). The Endangered Species Committee is
commonly known as the "God Committee". In opposing the Packwood amendment, infra note 432, Senator Akaka remarked, "This committee will make a lifeor-death decision .... Seven mortal men will be empowered to decide the fate of
the spotted owl. It's no wonder they call this committee the God Committee or
God Squad." 136 CONG. REc. S16,802 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1990).
379. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(4), (h)(A). The committee members are (1) the Secretary of Agriculture, (2) the Secretary of the Army, (3) the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors, (4) the Administrator of EPA, (5) the Secretary of
the Interior, (6) the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and (7) a state representative. Id. § 1536(e)(3). An exemption requires the support of five of the seven members. Id. § 1536(h).
380. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(2)(A), (h)(1)(A)(iv).
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exemption process has been invoked only three times, and the

"God Committee" has granted just one exemption, conditioned
upon a comprehensive mitigation plan for Nebraska whooping
cranes.ss
E. The Effect of Listing Columbia River Salmon
No one can predict whether any of the petitioned salmon
stocks will be listed under the ESA, or what activities might be
affected by a listing. However, if the recent listing of the Sacramento winter chinook is a guide, it seems likely that there will be
some listings because many Columbia stocks are more depressed
than the seventy-five percent decline that prompted NMFS to list
the Sacramento winter chinook.a A listing would probably require increased mainstem flows, much as changed dam operations
were ordered to benefit the Sacramento run.Us In addition, harvest restrictions cannot be ruled out, especially for stocks like the
Snake River fall chinook, which are harvested heavily both in the
ocean and in the lower riverss Finally, in the Sacramento listing,
NMFS demonstrated a sensitivity to genetic diversity,"s which

might mean that the federal fishery agency will devote particular
attention to depleted Columbia Basin wild stocks. We are unlikely to know the accuracy of these predictions for some time.ase

381. See D. ROHLF, supra note 337, at 136 n.161 (discussing the Grayrocks
Darn case, involving whooping crane habitat along the Platte River).
382. See supra notes 318-22, 324-25 and accompanying text.
383. See supra text preceding note 323.
384. See PAST AND PRESENT ABUNDANCE REPORT, supra note 326, at 17 (78%
harvest rate in 1983-84). If the ESA imposes harvest restrictions, even Indian
treaty harvests could be affected. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986)
(Eagle Protection Act abrogated right to hunt eagles on reservations). However,
ESA regulation probably could not restrict the tribe's 50% harvest share. See
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658 (1979), aff'g United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash.
1974). See generally F. COHEN, supra note 3.
385. NMFS estimated that a run size of 400-1000 fish was necessary to maintain genetic diversity. 55 Fed. Reg. 12,191 (1990).
386. NMFS proposed listing Snake River sockeye as an endangered species
on April 2, 1991, and the Snake River fall and spring/summer chinook as
threatened species on June 7, 1991. See supra note 11.
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F. The Salmon Summit
In response to the status report he requested,""7 Senator
Mark 0. Hatfield convened a series of meetings among representatives of the major users of Columbia streamflows aimed at designing measures to avert an ESA listing. Quickly dubbed the
"Salmon Summit," ' these meetings have engaged a wide variety
of water resource uses and have helped to educate a segment of
the public on the perilous condition of the Columbia's fish runs.
Curiously, the summit failed to include any representative from
the state or federal fish and wildlife agencies. Moreover, the summit was not able to bring itself to consider seriously, let alone
endorse, the fishery coalition's flow proposal.
The summit's chief recommendation with respect to flows
was to suggest lowering the reservoir pools at the four Corps of
Engineers projects on the Snake to facilitate increased water velocities with less water38 9 Although Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus
suggested lowering the pools twenty-five feet or more,390 BPA recommended lowering only the Lower Granite Reservoir to minimum operating level, about five feet." ' BPA also proposed to
double the amount of water available for juvenile fish passage on
the Snake and to expand a squawfish control program to elimi387. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
388. See Koberstein, supra note 10; Cohn & Henjum, Salmon Savior, The
Sunday Oregonian, Feb. 24, 1991, (Northwest Magazine) at 8.
389. See SALMON SUMMIT, STATUS OF SALMON SUMMIT DELIBERATIONS ON MITIGATION AND SURVIVAL ISSUES (1990) (portraying a range of possible measures)
[hereinafter SALMON SUMMIT STATUS REPORT].
390. Koberstein, supra note 10; Cohn & Henjum, Salmon Savior, The Sunday Oregonian, Feb. 24, 1991, (Northwest Magazine) at 8. The Columbia Basin
Fish and Wildlife Authority estimated that a 30 foot drawdown in the Lower
Granite reservoir would produce the same travel time through the reservoir at a
flow of 85 kcfs as would a flow of 140 kcfs at normal reservoir levels. Fishery
Coalition Flow Proposal, supra note 300, at 39. Reservoir drawdowns thus offer
the prospect of reducing juvenile fish travel time with substantially less water, an
option many in Idaho find attractive because it would allow maintenance of higher
reservoir levels and pose less of a threat to current operation of Idaho Power Company's dams on the middle Snake.
391. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., THE COLUMBIA BASIN ACCORD II (1991)
[hereinafter COLUMBIA BASIN ACCORD II]. By 1995, BPA's "objective" is to supply
1.2 maf for the Snake fish runs-the same amount of water promised by the Columbia Basin Program's Water Budget ten years ago. See supra note 89.
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nate predators of salmon smolt. 8s .
Doubling the amount of water for the Snake runs sounds like
a meaningful improvement unless the amount of water under the
BPA proposal (0.9 maf) is compared to the existing Snake River
Water Budget (approximately 1.2 maf). ass Thus, BPA's proposed
doubling of Snake River flows would supply only seventy-five percent of the current Water Budget. Further, the proposal ignores
both the fishery coalition's recommendation for the mid and
lower Columbia and the problem of summer flows. 3"
Undoubtedly, the Salmon Summit served a valuable educational role. The summit's consideration of harvest control, habitat
protection, and production planning measures may lead to important changes in the Columbia Basin Program.9 5 In particular, the
summit has taken up important fish production issues that question the emphasis on hatchery production to satisfy current harvest levels. Hatcheries have had substantial adverse effects on
wild stocks and are the principal cause for at least one of the ESA
petitions. 3 " However, supplying three-quarters of the existing
Water Budget on the Snake, ignoring the flow recommendations
on the Columbia, and avoiding the summer flow issue will not resolve the mainstem passage problem and will not obviate the
need for ESA protection.
In a larger sense, the Salmon Summit, like the ESA petitions,
reflects the failure of the Columbia Basin Program to reallocate
hydropower operations. BPA's flow proposal concedes that only
about one-third of the Snake River Water Budget has been supplied in recent years.39' Ironically, the program's inability to
achieve the congressional directive of parity between hydropower
operations and fish protection has widened the circle of negotiations to include other users of Columbia Basin streamflows. This
is a welcome development, as is the attention that the summit
392. Columbia Basin Accord II, supra note 390.
393. See supra note 89.
394. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
395. See SALMON SUMMIT STATUS REPORT, supra note 389.
396. The condition of the Columbia River coho cannot be blamed on the hydroelectric system because these fish spawn in the lower river, below Bonneville
Dam and do not face the mainstem passage problems confronting the upper basin
runs. On the adverse effects of hatcheries, see Goodman, supra note 2.
397. See COLUMBIA BASIN ACCORD II, supra note 391 (proposing to double the
water available from 0.45 to 0.9 maf, while the current budget is 1.2 maf).
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gave to the interrelationship between hatchery production and
harvest management. Nonetheless, the summit should not deflect
attention from the long-promised reallocation of river flows from
hydropower generation to fishery protection. That is where the
principal opportunities and biggest challenges remain. In this respect, the Salmon Summit has proven to be even less ambitious
than the Columbia Basin Program.
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF
FULFILLING THE PARITY PROMISE

Over a decade ago, in December 1980, President Carter
signed into law the Northwest Power Act, a statute calling for
revolutionary changes in hydroelectric project operations to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife adversely affected by
Columbia Basin hydroelectric projects. The chief vehicle for producing these changes was the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program, mandated by section 4(h) of the Act. 8 " Unfortunately,
the program has failed to produce the fundamental changes in
system operations envisioned by the Act. The Northwest Power
Planning Council has been more successful in protecting areas
from future hydroelectric development, however, and has also
proved itself an effective lobbyist for congressional funding of
mechanical bypass systems at Corps of Engineers dams on the
mainstem Columbia and Snake Rivers.'"
There are two basic reasons for the failure to make the fishery resource a "co-equal partner" with the power resource.' °"
First, although Congress instructed the Northwest Power Planning Council not to become a super fish and wildlife agency,'" 1
the Council has been unable to resist such a role. Consequently, it
has rejected a number of program amendments proffered by the
fishery agencies and tribes aimed at making the program more
effective. Frequently, the Council overruled the agencies and
tribes by saddling them with the impossible burden of proving
398. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h) (1988).
399. See supra notes 237-46, 267-69 (protected areas), 227 (mechanical bypass) and accompanying text.
400. See H.R. REP. No. 976, supra note 6, at 49, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5989, 6015.
401. 126 CONG. REC. 29,810 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980) (remarks of Cong. John
Dingell).
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that the precise biological benefits of their proposals justify their
costs.402 The Council also interjected its staff into basic fishery
management issues and imposed additional bureaucratic hurdles
40
as preconditions for implementing various program measures. 3
One fishery advocate estimates that the Council's procedural orientation usually produces delays a year or two for implementing
measures included in its program,
as compared to fishery mea4
sures outside the program.. "
A second reason the "co-equal partnership" has not materialized is the federal water managers' consistent failure to implement the program, especially in the area of fish flows. The worst
offender has been the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers which
neither believes it must implement the program nor supply written reasons why it cannot.406 Moreover, the Council has not been
402. See, e.g., supra notes 149, 154-56 and accompanying text (concerning
spill levels), notes 93-99, 190-93 and accompanying text (concerning flows). The
Act called for action based on "best available scientific knowledge," not scientific
certainty. Although Professor Lee insightfully propounded the "adaptive management" approach of "learning by doing"-which effectively lowers the burden of
proof for taking action-"adaptive management" apparently has never been applied to the fish flow issue. See generally Lee & Lawrence, supra note 47.
403. In comments on a draft of this Article, John Volkman, the Council's senior counsel for fish and wildlife, agreed that the Council should generally defer to
the fish agencies and tribes on biological questions, and contended that the Council usually does so. He maintained that the Council must nevertheless ask hard
questions of the agencies and tribes about the soundness of their proposals.
Volkman suggested that the Council must ensure that species conservation questions and interbasin conflicts are aired, among other things. He added that "it's
difficult for a Council whose effectiveness depends on its persuasiveness to persuade others to implement initiatives the Council doesn't feel are soundly based."
Personal communications from John Volkman to Michael Blumm (Feb. 27, 1991).
We do not mean to suggest that the Council should not ask hard questions,
but we object if doing so imposes impossible burdens of proof regarding biological
issues. Imposing insurmountable proof burdens conflicts with the congressional intent of taking expeditious action to reallocate fish-hydropower priorities. See
supra notes 46-49, infra notes 463-64 and accompanying text.
404. Lothrop Interview, supra note 254. Lothrop also noted that additional
delays may occur if the Council schedules interim milestones that trigger Council
votes. He acknowledged that some measures, such as the Umatilla Basin Water
Enhancement Program, supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text, would have
experienced delays without the Council's assistance.
405. The program directs federal water management agencies to implement
the program or supply written explanations why implementation is physically, legally, or otherwise impractical, including all possible allowances to permit implementation. 1987 PROGRAM, supra note 14, § 1203(a)(4)(b), at 150.
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particularly interested in enforcing the program.' 6 Instead, the
Council has assumed a role as a mediator between fish and power
interests instead of being an advocate for its restoration program.
The challenge of securing adequate fish flows in the Columbia River Basin should not be minimized. The task seemed much
easier a decade ago when the Northwest was enjoying a long-term
power surplus. Today, without a surplus, and with the severe economic and environmental questions confronting new coal and nuclear power plants, power managers have new incentives to maxi40 7
mize hydropower to meet the region's electric needs.
Fish flows do not reduce power production, however. Flows
create hydropower. Unfortunately, the flows the fish need are in
the spring and summer, when demand for power in the Northwest
is low. The fish-hydropower tradeoff is thus actually one of timing, and the real challenge is to devise incentives to market power
that fish flows will produce in the spring and summer and to conserve power in the winter during peak demands. The keys to fulfilling the "co-equal partnership" that Congress called for in
198040 involve (1) changing BPA's power rates to encourage electric consumption corresponding more closely to the natural shape
of Columbia Basin streamflows; (2) increasing electricity exchanges between the Pacific Northwest and the Pacific Southwest
to market fish-flow power in California and Arizona in the spring
and summer and return power during the winter; (3) placing a
high priority on acquiring new resources to help meet winter peak
loads, especially weatherization measures, more stringent model
conservation standards, and wind power; and (4) modifying
BPA's industrial power sale contracts to provide for complete interruptability during the winter.' 09
Senator Mark Hatfield recently charged that the Corps "continues to hide
behind a bureaucratic curtain and pretend it has no responsibility to change the
very operations that are killing these fish." 137 Cong. Rec. S3918, S3919 (1991)
Senator Hatfield concluded that "this can-do agency is becoming a don't-know
agency." Id.
406. See supra notes 58, 152-53, 181-85, 208-10, 310 and accompanying text.
407. "Nonfirm strategies" are expected to transform surplus hydropower into
firm power supplies-adding about 1000 megawatts by the year 2000 and another
1500 by 2010. See Lee, Hydro AL Dente, Northwest Energy News, July/Aug. 1990,
at 19 (Northwest Power Planning Council).
408. H.R. REP. No. 976, supra note 6, at 49, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5989, 6015.
409. See J. Lazar, Electric Power Resource Evaluation For Improved Fish
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All of the above measures are within the existing authority of
BPA and the Northwest Power Planning Council. However, their
track record inspires little confidence in their willingness to aggressively reshape the hydroelectric system to make it compatible
with fishery protection. We therefore recommend congressional
action to ensure that these measures are carried out and also to
overcome the institutional obstacles that continue to frustrate attainment of the decade old parity promise.
In addition to directing implementation of the measures
noted above, amendments to the Northwest Power Act should
unequivocally declare that the Council must defer to the biological expertise of the fishery agencies and tribes, especially on the
critical issue of mainstem flows. Although the Council might legitimately reject the recommended flows on grounds of economic infeasibility, 10 it should not substitute its biological judgment for
that of the fishery agencies and tribes on matters requiring biological expertise.' 11 Moreover, if the fishery coalition's recommended flows are economically feasible, Congress should resolve
Migration (report to the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Comm'n., Jan. 31, 1991);
Statement of J. Donaldson on BPA's 1991 Rate Case proposal (March 7, 1991).
BPA belatedly issued a draft EIS on its 1981 power sale contracts in late 1990
under court order. See Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677 (9th Cir.
1984), discussed in Blumm, NEPA Meets the Northwest Power Act (and
Prevails), 25 Nat. Resources J. 1005 (1985). The power agency did discuss an alternative that would increase interruptability of service to its industrial customers, but the models and assumptions BPA chose led the agency to conclude that
greater interruptability of industrial sales would produce higher flows in the fall,
not the spring. Thus, the agency concluded that this alternative would actually
adversely affect the fish runs. U.S. Dept. of Energy, Bonneville Power Admin, 1
Draft Environmental Impact Statement on Initial Northwest Power Act Power
Sale Contracts at 2-9, 4-44 to 4-45, 4-51 to 4-53 (1990). Not only do BPA's assumptions and models bear close scrutiny, but the whole issue of how industrial
sales can contribute to higher spring flows warrants investigation by an entity
without BPA's close ties to the industry.
410. The Council is required to protect and restore fish and wildlife, while
assuring an "adequate efficient, economical and reliable power supply". 16 U.S.C.
§ 839b(h)(5) (1988). See Parity II, supra note 46, at 146-52 (arguing for a standard based on economic and technical feasibility). However, any finding of economic infeasibility must take into account the past debt the hydroelectric resource
owes the fish and wildlife resource, the relative water needs of fish and wildlife
and power, and alternative electric rate structures and power marketing arrangements that would encourage more natural streamflows. See, e.g., J. Lazar, supra
note 409; J. Donaldson, supra note 409.
411. See supra notes 49, 154-55, 190-93, 199-201, 310 and accompanying text.
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the issue itself by adopting those flows. 12
Congress also should not tolerate the Council's failure to enforce its program. The Council apparently needs to be reminded
that its function is not simply to approve fish and wildlife program measures, but to ensure that they are implemented, even if
that requires taking enforcement action against recalcitrant federal water managers.'1 8 Of course, a change in the Council's attitude will not by itself solve the enforcement problem. The statute's ambiguous enforcement provisions will continue to hamper
program implementation, even with a change in the Council's
attitude.
Congress should clarify the enforcement provisions by extending BPA's obligation to act in a manner "consistent" with the
program' 1 to all the other federal water managers. It makes little
sense to subject BPA to one standard, and the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to another.'1 5 The ambiguities inherent in the
cumbersome current standard of "taking [the program] into account at each relevant stage of decisionmaking processes to the
fullest extent practicable" have and will continue to hamper restoration efforts unnecessarily.'41 Congress should also affirm the
judicial determination that the directive to give "equitable treatment" to fish and wildlife imposes a separate, independent obligation on federal water managers." '
412. It could do so by defining the "improved" flows it directed the Council
to establish, see 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(ii), as the flows recommended by the
fishery agencies and tribes.
413. Ironically, the only time a court considered the obligation to take the
program into account to the "fullest extent practicable," see supra note 58, was in
a suit filed by the National Wildlife Federation, not the Council. See National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 801 F.2d 1505, 1514-15 (9th
Cir. 1986) (finding a violation of the Northwest Power Act).
414. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A).
415. Because the Columbia Basin Program relies heavily upon habitat managed by federal land management agencies like the Forest Service and the Bureau
of Land Management, Congress ought to require these agencies to act consistent
with the program as well.
416. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(ii); see supra notes 152-53, 181-84 and accompanying text (on the failure to implement the program).
417. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(i). The Ninth Circuit indicated that equitable
treatment is required independently from the program in Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima Nation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 746 F.2d
466, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1984). See also National Wildlife Fed'n. v. Federal Energy
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The above reforms would resolve most of the institutional
difficulties hampering the Columbia Basin Program. Another legislative initiative would make achievement of biologically justifiable fish flows much easier and would also make the Council's conservation and power plan more environmentally sound.' 1
Amending the Northwest Power Act to include fuel switching
from electricity to natural gas as a conservation measure would
serve both purposes.' 1' Increased reliance on natural gas would
dampen peak winter demands for electricity. Meeting those peak
loads is the principal reason why hydroelectric managers resist
high spring river flows. The managers now store the spring freshet
in upper basin reservoirs so the water can be used later to meet
winter peak load demands. Less hydropower would be necessary
if the Act encouraged use of natural gas as a replacement for part
of the electric demands' 2 0 This sort of fuel switching might also
Regulatory Comm'n., 801 F.2d 1505, 1515 (9th Cir. 1986). The independent nature
of these obligations would require federal water managers to state how and why
their actions produce equitable treatment when the Council's program has not
directly addressed a particular issue. For example, BPA would have to include in
its decision on non-treaty storage (see supra notes 288, 301-04 and accompanying
text) an equitable treatment statement, not simply claiming that equitable treatment is satisfied by not being inconsistent with the Council's program. See NONTREATv STORAGE AGREEMENT, supra note 288, at 9. On equitable treatment statements, see Parity II, supra note 46, at 152-56.
418. See generally 1986 POWER PLAN supra note 17.

419. The Northwest Power Act defines "conservation" to mean "any reduction in electric power consumption as a result of increases in the efficiency of energy use, production or distribution." 16 U.S.C. § 839a(3). Arguably, switching
from electricity to natural gas produces an increase in energy efficiency use because natural gas is a more efficient heat source. Cf. Shaner, NOFI-Like Heating
Oil Campaign Will Take Grass-Roots Course, 75 NAT'L PETROLEUM NEws 44
(1983). However, conventional wisdom indicates that fuel switching by itself is not
a conservation measure. See, e.g., Michie, Impacts of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act on the Development of Energy Resources in the Pacific Northwest: An Analysis of the Resource Acquisition Priority Scheme, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 299, 315-16 (1981).
420. The Northwest Power Planning Council recently estimated that reliance
on natural gas could displace 4200 megawatts of electricity, the equivalent of
about seven coal plants. However, the Council rejected this idea because it would
expose the region to "gas price increases and supply shortages." See DRAFT 1991
POWER PLAN, supra note 302, at 17. An earlier study prepared for the Council
concluded that natural gas could supply all of the region's expected energy demands and suggested switching from electricity to natural gas, rather than using
natural gas to fuel combustion turbines to produce electricity, because fuel switching would be more energy efficient. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, Fu-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985156

1991]

UNRAVELING OF THE PROMISE

reduce carbon dioxide emissions that contribute to global warming through the "greenhouse effect."" 1
These amendments to the Northwest Power Act would go a
long way toward making adequate mainstem fish flows a reality.
The virtue of hydroelectric power is its great flexibility. In contrast, the fishery resource has reached the limits of its flexibility.
Accommodation, long overdue, must now come from the hydropower resource if the "co-equal partnership" Congress envisioned
is to be achieved. Hydropower and marketing flexibility must be
exploited to restructure the Columbia Basin hydroelectric system
around biologically sound fish flows.
What is perhaps in even shorter supply than river flows are
Northwest officials with the courage and vision to see that reality.
Leadership must initially come from the region's governors who
are responsible for appointing members to the Council. If the
Council is to avoid becoming merely a rubber stamp, ratifying
deals made by others, the governors must place a high priority on
appointing members to the Council who understand both the biological and institutional dynamics of restoring the Columbia Basin's fish runs.
Clearly, increased fish flows will affect power revenues. But
the region can absorb the cost. Unlike the costs of preserving old
growth forests,'2 the costs of fish flows can be spread broadly
throughout the Northwest and California. Moreover, there are
undoubtedly ways to reduce those costs. Creative pricing can
dampen peak winter demands for power. Increased conservation
measures, interregional power exchanges, and incentives to replace electric heat with natural gas provide promising alternatives
to reduce electric demands. Developing markets for electricity in
the spring and early summer, when fish flows will produce inTURE NATURAL GAS COST AND AVAILABILITY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST

1-7 (1990).

421. Fewer carbon emissions would result if reliance on natural gas displaced
new coal plants. Admittedly, natural gas would increase carbon emissions to the
extent that it substitutes for hydropower. See generally Solomon & Freedberg,
The Greenhouse Effect: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 20 ENVTL. L. 83 (1990);
Magraw, Global Change and International Law, 1 COLO. J. INT'L ENV'rL. L. &
POL'Y 1 (1990).
422. Old growth forests suitable for spotted owl habitat are clustered in "islands," and therefore disproportionately affect small, timber dependent communities. See, e.g., Blumm, Ancient Forests, Spotted Owls, and Modern Public Land
Law, 18 B.C. Envtl. Affairs 605 (1991).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985156

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 21.657

creased power, also needs investigation.
The Northwest Power Planning Council has thus far failed to
deliver the necessary mainstem flows, and it may have abdicated
this decision to NMFS under the ESA. The Council now ought to
focus its attention on how to supply biologically-based flows in
the most cost-effective manner possible. The Council should enlist the energy and fish and wildlife offices in the four Northwest
states in this effort. BPA, however, should not be involved. Its
long history of inflating the costs of fishery protection measures"s
should disqualify the federal power agency.
The Council's objective should not be to ascertain the level of
fish populations that are biologically necessary. That task belongs
to the fishery agencies and the Indian tribes, and they have already devoted years to investigating that question. The Council's
role should be to achieve the flows in a manner that is cost effective. After all, the Northwest Power Act recognizes minimizing
economic costs as a relevant but secondary factor to be considof the primary objective: achieving sound biologiered in pursuit
42
'
cal results.
Restructuring the Columbia Basin hydroelectric system
around biologically sound fish flows would be a major step toward
maintaining both a sustainable fishery and a sustainable power
supply."18 If the region can surmount this hurdle, the Columbia
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program will serve as a model for the rest
of the nation, and for the world, in making difficult environmental and economic tradeoffs. If, however, the necessary flows are
resisted, if short-term economic considerations continue to overwhelm the salmon's biological requirements, regional decision
makers will have knowingly squandered their last chance to restore a wondrous natural resource that embodies the history, culture, and spirit of the Pacific Northwest.
423. See Parity II, supra note 46, at 135-36, 147-49; Unfulfilled Promises,
supra note 32, at 173.
424. See Parity II, supra note 46, at 131-39 (analyzing 16 U.S.C. J
839b(h)(6)(C)).
425. See Lee, The Columbia River Basin: Experimenting With Sustainability, 31 ENV'T, July/Aug. 1989, at 6.
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VII. A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR LEE'S REBUILDING CONFIDENCE
Professor Kai Lee has been an influential architect and commentator on Northwest electric power policy and fish and wildlife
restoration for some time.4" We take his criticisms in the adjoining article 4 7 seriously, not simply because of his achievements,
but because they reflect a good deal of the conventional wisdom
about trade-offs between hydropower generation and fish restoration. Unfortunately, that conventional wisdom has failed to prevent stock extinctions such as the Snake River coho. 4 2 We think
that the incremental substantive changes he reluctantly proffers
offer far too little to achieve the "co-equal partnership" of fish
and hydropower that the Northwest Power Act's drafters envi-

sioned over a decade ago.4'

Professor Lee's reasons for not advocating more substantial
measures echo the shopworn excuses popularized by BPA and the
utilities and reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the institutional relationships created by the Act. His principal solution is
to have the Northwest governors appoint the Council to coordi-

nate the states' recommendations for a recovery plan in the event
of an ESA listing.'8 0 This would not require an amendment to the
426. See, e.g., Lee, The Path Along the Ridge: Regional Planningin the Face
of Uncertainty, 58 WASH. L. Rav. 317 (1983); Halbert & Lee, The Timber, Fish,
and Wildlife Agreement: Implementing Alternative Dispute Resolution in Washington State, 6 N.W. ENVTL.J. 139 (1990); K. LEE,supra note 30; Lee & Lawrence,
supra note 47; Volkman & Lee, supra note 50.
427. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence: Salmon, Science, and Law in the Columbia
Basin, 21 ENVTL. L. 745 (1991) [hereinafter Rebuilding Confidence].
428. See id. at 751-60. By coupling mention of the extinction of the Snake
River coho with an unfair accusation of NMFS as a "partisan" of the ocean harvest, Lee gives the false impression that harvest management was the chief cause
of the extinction, when in reality it was hydroelectric domination of mainstem
flows. Moreover, NMFS "partisan" status has not prevented the agency from presiding over dramatic cutbacks in the ocean harvest and spearheading efforts to
preserve and restore fish habitat for over a decade.
429. H. R. REP. No. 976, supra note 6, at 49, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5989, 6015. An example of Professor Lee's reticence to advocate change concerns his lukewarm endorsement of increased Snake River flows
as an "emergency response." Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 773,
779. The conditions responsible for this "emergency" hydropower dominance over
mainstem flows-have existed since at least the middle 1970s. See, e.g., E. Chaney, supra note 31.
430. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 803.
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ESA,"18 something Congress has shown it is reluctant to do."'
However, we have serious reservations about the utility of Professor Lee's suggestion. The legislative history of the 1988 ESA
amendments specifies that "the development and the content of
recovery plans will continue to be based solely on biological considerations.'
Given the Council's biological track record, we
think anadromous fish would fare better if the fish and wildlife
agencies of the . participating states made their own
recommendations."'

We also need to correct Professor Lee's misconception that
we wish to discard the Columbia Basin Program."' We have
never argued against the program's systemwide approach. In fact,
we endorse it wholeheartedly. We simply think the program has
not gone far enough in providing the fundamental prerequisite for

the success of a systemwide approach: increased mainstem flows.
Fish flows are in fact the quintessence of the systemwide approach because they require a coordinated response from hydropower resource managers.

What we argue against is the view, shared by Professor Lee
and the Council, of the Council's role in developing and implementing that systemwide approach. We interpret the Northwest
Power Act as a congressional directive to the Council to defer to
the biological judgment of the region's fishery agencies and
tribes. ' s s Lee acknowledges that deference is required in the area
of harvest control," 7 but not in the case of fish passage. The results can be seen in the Council's refusal to increase spills in both
431. Section 4(f)(4) of the ESA requires NMFS to allow an opportunity for
public comment prior to the approval of recovery plans. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(4)
(1988). The ESA also authorizes NMFS to involve appropriate public and private
agencies in developing recovery plans. Id. § 1533(f)(2).
432. Senator Packwood's 1990 attempt to legislatively initiate the Endangered Species Committee for the purpose of exempting federal timber sales from
spotted owl protections gathered little or no support in Congress. See 136 CONG.
Rac. S16,771-804 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1990).
433. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 928, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1988).
434. We do note that the net effect of Professor Lee's proposal is to relegate
the Council's role to making recommendations to NMFS, which is precisely the
opposite role of the two agencies under the Northwest Power Act.
435. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 780-81, 785.
436. See supra notes 49, 155, 310 and accompanying text.
437. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 764.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985156

1991]

UNRAVELING OF THE PROMISE

1986 and 1987.4' s The grounds for these denials was the Council's
contention that no "significant biological benefits would ensue.'"' Lee applauds the Council for its "science-driven planning
process,'" but this "science" regularly ignores the advice of the
biological experts. We think this biological hubris exceeds both
441
the Council's legal authority and its institutional competence.
The Northwest Power Act enables the Council to reject fishery
agency and tribal recommendations on grounds of economic and
technical 2 infeasibility, but not on grounds that it knows more
biology."
The Council's expansive view of its biological expertise
should be contrasted to its inability or unwillingness to recognize
its responsibility to enforce its own program. Lee repeatedly criticizes the limits on the Council's authority, claiming at one point
that the Council has "neither the authority nor resources to enforce its writ.' 4 In our opinion, the Council possesses a good
deal more authority than it thinks it has (or perhaps wants). The
Act requires BPA to act consistently with the Council's program
and obligates the other federal water managers to take the program into account at every relevant stage of decision making to
438. See supra notes 147-56, 194-210 and accompanying text.
439. See supra notes 149, 199-201 and accompanying text; Lee, Rebuilding
Confidence, supra note 427, at 795.
440. See Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 750.
441. See supra notes 49, 155, 310 and accompanying text.
442. See supra note 410 and accompanying text; Parity II, supra note 46, at
146-52. Lee charges us with "misinterpret[ing] the scientific uncertainty that
clouds the viability of the Columbia's anadromous fish," Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 746. He proceeds to explain the difficulties in estimating
the biological benefits of increased fish flows, id. at 770-72, presumably on the
assumption that knowledge of these benefits is a prerequisite for taking action.
This thinking echoes the Council's approach to spills. See supra notes 438-39 and
accompanying text. But it is fundamentally inconsistent with the Northwest
Power Act's legislative history, which emphasized the need for taking expeditious
action on the basis of less than perfect information. See H.R. Rep. No. 976, pt. 1,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1980) (recognizing that the Act's time deadlines "will not
afford an opportunity for extensive studies [or] the acquisition of new data ....");
Parity II, supra, at 125-27. Scientific uncertainty is simply not a viable excuse for
inaction. Moreover, Lee is misinformed when he suggests that the benefits of increased flows are "difficult to pick out from the background noise of natural fluctuations." Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra, note 427, at 759. See FISHERY COALITION'S FLOW PROPOSAL, supra note 300, at 20 (concluding that "increases in flow
are essential to improving smolt survival and rebuilding the runs").
443. See Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 764.
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If these are not iron-clad direc-

tives, they are nevertheless strong indications that Congress expected the program to be implemented.
The truth is we do not know how much enforcement authority the Council possesses because the Council has chosen not to
test its authority, ignoring program violations like the Corps' failure to implement the Water Budget or to satisfy its spill provisions." On the tough issues, those involving mainstem flows and
spills, the Council repeatedly has chosen not to play a meaningful
role, as illustrated by its willingness to wash its hands of any involvement in BPA's Non-Treaty Storage Agreement."' 6 Our view
is that the Council's lack of enforcement authority is the product
of its own self-fulfilling prophecy.
We sense that Professor Lee's objection to our emphasis on
increased mainstem flows and program enforcement is due to his
distaste for legalistic, regulatory measures."47 He quotes former

Council Chairman Chuck Collins to the effect that a policy-making body cannot rely on written authority to change things, but
instead must develop a "policy that is so logical, [and] makes
such good sense, that other parties will participate voluntarily."'

That sort of wistful thinking has haunted the Council since its
inception, leading it toward consensus building and away from
leadership. This is especially true on the mainstem flow issue,
where power interest consensus produces flows that are biologically insufficient, even in the eyes of the Fish Passage Center, the
entity the Council established to improve fish passage."' We ac0
knowledge that there is a role for planning and negotiations,"
444. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A), (11)(A)(ii) (1988). See supra notes 58, 122,
242, 309, 413 and accompanying text.
445. See supra notes 152-53 181-84, 397 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 288, 301-04 and accompanying text. The Council has
also failed to investigate a host of other measures that might free up water for
increased fish flows such as changes in the operations of Idaho Power Company's

dams on the middle Snake, additional interregional electric exchanges to benefit
fish, increases in interruptability of power sales to industrial customers, and the
potential of rate design changes and fuel switching to benefit fish. See, e.g., supra
note 409 and accompanying text.
447. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 780. ("infeasible to commandeer ...

single issue activism").

448. Id. at 796.
449. See id. at 794; supra note 55 and accompanying text.
450. We do not assert, as Lee charges, "that consensus building is the oppo-
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but too often the Council has sacrificed the biological needs of the
fish runs for the lowest common denominator of what is acceptable to BPA and the utilities.41 The goal of the Northwest Power
Act was not to spawn consensus among fish and power interests.
The Act aimed to spawn more fish, even if that required measures
opposed for economic reasons by BPA, the Corps, and the utilities."' The Council's preoccupation with consensus has produced
a paralysis, the ultimate products of which are the recent ESA
petitions.
Lee claims our "simple, sure remedy" of increasing mainstem
flows ignores other causes of the decline of the fish runs. 48 He
resurrects a number of old power interest arguments that (1) harvest management and hatchery operation are due some of the
blame,"' (2) no one can prove how much run sizes will improve if
flows are increased, 4' 5 and (3) flows are expensive. 4 " Control over
harvest management, like federal land management and water
site of leadership." Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 796. What we
claim is that consensus building is not a substitute for leadership.
451. Lee faults us for not supplying an example of the Council's "lowest common denominator" decision making. Id. at 788 n.168. We think that the Council's
spill decisions of 1986 and 1987 serve as nice illustrations. See supra notes 147-56,
194-210 and accompanying text. Lee contends that the 1986 spill decision was due
to the fact that "the Council could not agree that the fishery managers' claims
represented any biology on this question." Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra
note 927, at 795 n.190. He neglects to point out that, in rejecting increased spills,
the Council refused not only the recommendations of the fishery agencies and
tribes but those of its own staff as well. This is what we mean by the term "biological hubris." See also supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text. Lee also fails to
note that the resolution of the spill issue was achieved with no involvement of the
Council. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 768. See supra notes 25056 and accompanying text.
452. Congress admonished the Council that "cost should not be a deterrent if
a fish and wildlife need might be sacrificed to save dollars". H.R. REP. No. 976,
supra note 6, at 57, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Naws 5989.
However, it is clear that the Council has not heeded this admonition. See supra
notes 88 (rejecting the Coalition's sliding scale flows), 147-49 (rejecting spill recommendations of the fish and wildlife agencies, the tribes, and the Council's own
staff), 181-83 (the Council's chronic failure to implement the water budget), 30104 (failure to capitalize on the opportunity presented by Non-Treaty Storage
Agreement) and accompanying text.
453. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 747.
454. Id. at 755-57, 758-59, 778-79.
455. Id. at 759, 770-72, 794-796.
456. Id. at 762, 769, 775, 797.
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rights, was not addressed by Congress in the Northwest Power
Act. We do not suggest that the fish runs are not injured by such
activities. But, as Lee acknowledges, eighty percent of the decline
is hydropower related, and harvest levels have declined (dramatically in some cases) in recent years."57 Congress limited the Council's role to reallocating hydropower and fish priorities in the Columbia Basin. Among the beneficiaries were to be fish harvesters.
We do not see the usefulness of pointing to the Council's inability
to control harvests, land management activities, or water rights
when the Council has failed to exercise the authority it does possess to reallocate fish-hydropower priorities.
It is true that there is some uncertainty over the biological
results of increased flows, although not as much as Professor Lee
infers.' One way to resolve this uncertainty is to apply Lee's
own concept of "adaptive management"' s to test the flow levels
recommended by the fishery agencies and tribes. We remain puzzled why the Council thought adaptive management was appropriate for production planning, but not for mainstem flows.'" We

understood the concept to lower the burden of proof for taking
remedial action on the premise that close monitoring and midcourse corrections can avoid overprotective measures."s1 But we
now interpret Professor Lee to suggest that the concept is not so
much a biological form of policy analysis as a substitute for laboratory science."" If that is the idea, then adaptive management
will countenance maintaining the status quo while awaiting a scientifically "correct" solution. The wait will likely be a long one.
We think Congress wanted fewer studies and more action."'s We
thought so a decade ago.4"
457. Id. at 751, 763. In effect, these harvest cutbacks represent the equivalent
of the "harvest survival budget" Lee advocates. Id. at 798. There is no question
that the largest harvesters of Columbia River salmon are mainstem dams.
458. See generally FISHERY COALmON's FLOW PRPoSAL, supra note 300 (concluding the increased flows are essential to restoring run-sizes on the basis of
trend data that correlates run sizes with flows).
459. See Lee & Lawrence, supra note 47.
460. See Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 764-67.
461. See Parity IV, supra note 32, at 478-79.
462. See Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 783-84.
463. After all, Congress directed that the program be based on "the best
available scientific knowledge," not scientific certainty. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(B)
(1988). See also supra notes 442, 452 and accompanying text.
464. See Parity I, supra note 6, at 523-24; Parity II, supra note 46, at 125-26.
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On the cost of increased mainstem flows, there is about as
much uncertainty as there is with the biological results. Lee notes
the difficulty of discerning the biological benefits from increased
flows, implying that their costs might be too high in light of these
uncertainties.' 6 The cost figures he cites are based on the assumption that the purpose of the Columbia River is to produce
only hydropower, an assumption contradicted by an examination
of the statutes authorizing the dams,'" and one flatly inconsistent
with the purposes of the Northwest Power Act which include
both hydropower generation and fishery protection as coequals."" Moreover, the reality is that over a decade after the
passage of the Northwest Power Act, no one really knows what
those costs may be, except that they are small relative to, say, the
coAts BPA incurs for its share of the Washington Public Power
Supply System (WPPSS) nuclear plants, two-thirds of which produce no electricity.4" That is why we suggest that the Council
should study alternative ways to reduce the costs of achieving the
flows recommended by the fishery coalition. Possible alternatives
include increasing interregional power exchanges, development of
new power markets, dampening peak winter demands through
creative pricing, fuel switching, and greater interruptability of
electric power sold to BPA's industrial customers.4 ' The results
of such a study might470 form the basis for amendments to the
Northwest Power Act.
Professor Lee claims that an ESA listing will precipitate
465. Compare Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 772 n. 98 with
id. at 762, 769, 775, 796-97.
466. See generally Hydropower v. Salmon, supra note 22; supra note 280 and
accompanying text.
467. 16 U.S.C. § 839(2) and (6); see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
468. See, e.g., Parity III, supra note 51, at 357 n.331 (noting that during

1984-85 BPA fish and wildlife expenditures amounted to around 3% of its
WPPSS costs).
469. See supra notes 409, 419-24 and accompanying text. Professor Lee's ap-

parent assumption that BPA's power marketing activities have no relationship to
mainstem flows and spills, reflects a lack of understanding of the critically impor-

tant relationship between power marketing and river management. See, e.g., J.
Lazar, supra note 409.
470. See supra notes 410-20 and accompanying text. Unlike Professor Lee, we
do not consider the fact that BPA's industrial (mostly aluminum plants) or utility
customers might oppose amendments to the Northwest Power Act to be a sufficient reason not to propose them. Cf. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427,
at 803 n.219.
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"tragic choices" and suggests there may be a conflict between the
effort to rescue endangered stocks and the Council's systemwide
approach. 47 ' He raises the specter of internecine wars among fishery advocates, occasioned by harvest restrictions and state resentment over federal preemption of management authority. 47 2 We
believe the results of a listing will be a good deal more salutary.
For "threatened" species, the listing agencies have sufficient authority to design taking regulations and recovery plans to allow
47
harvests and to avoid interfering with vested water rights.
Moreover, as we have indicated, increased flows do not necessarily
conflict with the systemwide approach.' 7 ' If the "tragic choice"
Lee fears involves species preservation versus continued cheap regional electric power costs, the ESA requires this choice to be
made on a national, not a regional basis.' 7 If the "tragic choice"
is between the systemwide supplementation program'" and species preservation, the likely outcome will be modification of the
former to preserve the latter. If that is not always possible, federal law says that species
preservation must prevail in the absence
4 77
exemption.
ESA
an
of
Professor Lee's suggestion that the Council play a role under
the ESA has received support from those claiming that the region
would otherwise lose control over its resources to federal agencies
under the ESA.' 7 This argument overlooks the fact that most of
the key decisions with respect to the allocation of the Columbia
471. See Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 776-78, 792.
472. Id. at 797, 801. As a matter of fact, ever since they submitted joint initial
program recommendations to the Council a decade ago, supra notes 7, 63-84 and
accompanying text, the region's fishery agencies and Indian tribes have seldom, if
ever, disagreed over matters of habitat protection like mainstem flows. See, e.g.,
supra note 55.
473. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
474. See supra text following note 435.
475. See D. ROHLF, supra note 337, at 87-88.
476. Note that the Council's integrated system planning process, aimed at increasing production throughout the basin, see Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra
note 427, at 764-67, assumes safe mainstem passage. Its success will therefore be a
function of improved fish flows.
477. See supra notes 363-67, 377-81 and accompanying text.
478. For example, The Oregonianis convinced that ESA listing "could devastate the region (giving] little leeway but to shut down Columbia River power generation for three months a year." Ask All to Save Salmon, The Sunday Oregonian,
Feb. 3, 1991, at B8, col. 1. The Oregonian'seditorial gave no reasoning in support
of this completely inaccurate assertion.
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Basin streamflows are now made by federal agencies like BPA
and the Corps of Engineers. We think this alleged concern over
the loss of regional control masks anxiety over giving decisionmaking authority on the mainstem flow issue to an agency like
the National Marine Fisheries Service, whose principal concern is
the biological needs of the fish.- After all, NMFS is a member of
the fishery coalition which recommended the fixed flow proposal
in 1990,'7 and might be expected to promulgate a recovery plan
that included similar mainstem flow levels. In our view, if the goal
is to restore the health of the fish runs, why not place control over
the hydropower-fishery tradeoff in the hands of an agency with
the appropriate biological expertise?
If the Council were to become responsible for developing an
ESA recovery plan, it would probably follow an approach similar
to that recommended by Professor Lee: (1) continue to study the
Water Budget 6 0 and the effect of hatcheries,' 6 ' (2) increase pressure for harvest cutbacks, (3) increase flows somewhat on the
Snake,'8

but not the Columbia, and (4) disregard summer

flows.' 8 Such an approach would continue to ignore the fishery
coalition's recommended flows on the mid and lower Columbia,
would ignore the coalition's call for summer flows, and would not

479. See supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
480. Professor Lee erroneously assumes that the Water Budget amounts to a
substantial reallocation of "resources in the name of tribal tradition and environmental law." Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 772. Actually, the
Water Budget has never supplied the flows it promised, has regularly gone unimplemented, and its chief effect seems to be to confer a small benefit to fish migration before June 15 at the expense of fish migrating after June 15. See supra notes
100-06, 178-93, 307 and accompanying text. These facts may help explain why he
concludes that "the change brought about by the Water Budget lies well within
the dotted lines indicating the range of uncertainty in the available data." Lee,
Rebuilding Confidence, supra, at 772. The simple truth is that the Water
Budget's benefits are small because the budget has not materially improved fish
flows.
481. Certainly, the effects of hatcheries deserve close scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Goodman, supra note 2. But some supplementation seems necessary if the Council's goal to double run sizes is to be approached. See, e.g., Columbia River InterTribal Fish Comm'n., Integrated Tribal Production Plan (1990).
482. Actually, Professor Lee's suggestion seems simply to provide the Snake
flows the Water Budget promised nearly a decade ago but never delivered. Lee,
Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 798. This is also BPA's proposed solution. See supra note 391.
483. See Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note 427, at 798-800.
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come close to satisfying the recommendations on the Snake. 4"
The result would continue the longstanding domination of hydropower over salmon in the Columbia Basin, would produce continued extinctions of anadromous fish stocks, and would, in our
view, be the ultimate "tragic choice."

484. See supra note 298. Professor Lee closes his article with a warning that
our recognition of the political nature of decision making in the face of uncertainty (such as that which pervades salmon restoration efforts) may countenance
"raw political results" that are incapable of responding effectively to the complexities that exist in the Columbia Basin. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence, supra note
427, at 804. Perhaps we should have used the word "policy" instead of "political."
Our point is that salmon restoration does not involve only technical, scientific
questions, to be left to "experts," but is an issue-like all questions involving risk
and uncertainty-about values. Values are too important to be left to technical
experts. If wild salmon runs exist in the 21st century, it will be because the public-those who elect politicians and who attend public hearings-demand it. Our
hope is that readers of this article and Professor Lee's will see that the future of
wild salmon is in their hands.
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